govinfo:USCOURTS-akd-3_21-cv-00153-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

PATRICIA A. YELDER,

Plaintiff,

DOUG BURGUM, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Dkt. 84]

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant the United States (“Defendant” or “Defendants”)1 filed a motion for
summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on September 19, 2025 (the
“Motion”).2
Defendant argues that pro se Plaintiff Patricia Yelder (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Yelder”)
can show no genuine issue of material fact based on her allegations that her employer, the
U.S. Department of Interior’s National Park Service (“the Agency” or “NPS”),
discriminated against her in violation of her civil rights.3 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges she
was discriminated against based on her race, sex, and disability and retaliated against based

1 The singular and plural are used interchangeably throughout this Order when referring to
the defendants due to the claims at least purportedly being brought against the government
as well as individuals.
2 Dkt. 84 (Motion for Summary Judgment).
3 Id. at 1-2.

on her prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity activity.4 As explained below, the
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
Ms. Yelder is an NPS employee5 who filed a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights
(“initial complaint”) on June 25, 2021.6 She filed an Amended Complaint for Employment
Discrimination on May 12, 2023, “alleging sex discrimination, retaliation for prior
protected EEO Activity, and racial discrimination under Title VII, age discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act , and disability discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act.” 7 Upon the Defendants’ Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss, 8 the Court dismissed
Ms. Yelder’s claims of sex discrimination under Title VII and age discrimination under the
ADEA and granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint as to her sex discrimination
claim only.9 Ms. Yelder filed another amended complaint on May 24, 2024,10 and the Court
subsequently ordered Ms. Yelder to identify the specific defendants against whom she was
bringing claims.11 Ms. Yelder refiled the amended complaint (“operative complaint”) on

4 Id.
5 Dkt. 1 (Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights).
6 Id. The initial complaint was double-sided and only the odd pages were visible on the
docket. Defendants attached a full copy of the initial complaint as an Exhibit to their
Motion to Dismiss at Dkt. 13-1.
7 Dkt. 27 (Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination).
8 Dkt. 34 (Order Granting Partial Motion to Dismiss).
9 Id.
10 Dkt. 46 (Plaintiff Amendment for Sex Discriminating Reasons).
11 Dkt. 48 (Order Regarding Amended Complaint).

June 24, 2024, naming specific defendants.12 The operative complaint names the following
defendants: Deb Haaland, Robyn Burch, Joseph Blaeuer (Human Resources Officer),
Trudy Hawkins (Employee Relations Specialist), David Queja, and Sandra Swank
(Employee Relations Specialist).13 The Court indicated that filing would replace Plaintiff’s
prior amended complaint in its entirety.14
A. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant’s Motion argues that Plaintiff has failed to identify any cognizable
instances of discrimination. Defendant specifically argues that Plaintiff cannot support a
claim under Title VII or any other statute for retaliation or discrimination.15 According to
Defendant, Plaintiff cannot support her claims for discrimination on the bases of race or
sex, and Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims are not supported by evidence either.16
Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim is equally meritless, and she
fails to show that the agency did not have legitimate reasons for any actions it took. 17
1. Undisputed Facts
Defendants draw upon the operative complaint filed at Docket 51 to set forth the
facts that are not in dispute.18 Plaintiff is an NPS employee who has worked for the Agency

12 Dkt. 51 (Plaintiff’s Response to Order Regarding Amended Complaint).
13 Dkt. 51 at 1-2.
14 Dkt. 48.
15 Dkt. 84 at 3-10.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Dkt. 84 at 3-10. The parties have not filed a joint statement of undisputed facts, so the
Court is drawing upon the defendants’ submission of undisputed facts, cross-checked with

since 2011.19 Plaintiff submits medical documents in support of her claim that she suffers
from dysphonia, a vocal cord disorder rendering her unable to speak, and which is triggered
only under certain conditions.20 Plaintiff also injured her wrist and shoulder while at work
in March 2016.21 Plaintiff’s claims in this action stem from events that took place in 2016.22
Plaintiff filed several Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaints between
2016 and 2018, all of which were resolved in favor of the Agency. 23 Upon leaving federal
service in the 1980s, Ms. Yelder was a GS-07, but she was rehired as a GS-05 in 2011.24
2. Defendant’s Submission of Undisputed Facts.
Defendant unilaterally submits the following set of undisputed facts:
1. Plaintiff received a fully successful rating on her FY 2015 Employee
Performance Appraisal Plan. Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration of her FY
2015 EPAP was denied.25
Plaintiff does not deny this.26
2. On March 7, 2016, Joseph Blaeuer told Plaintiff she could use sick leave or
report to work in response to Plaintiff emailing him that she was sick.27

the operative complaint and Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition re Motion for Summary
Judgment at Dkt. 90.
19 Dkt. 51 at 4.
20 Dkt. 27-5 at 11.
21 Dkt. 84 at 3.
22 Id. at 2.
23 Dkt. 6-1 (Exhibit to Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause: March 23, 2021 EEOC
Final Decision).
24 Dkt. 84 at 4.
25 Dkt. 84, Ex. B.
26 Dkt. 90 (Response in Opposition re Motion for Summary Judgment) at 14.
27 Dkt. 84, Ex. C, Ex. J at 7-9.

Plaintiff does not deny this.28
3. On April 11, 2016, Plaintiff received a letter of warning for leaving a file cabinet
that contained confidential human resources documents unlocked on Thursday,
March 17, 2016, failed to notify her supervisor or anyone else of its unsecured
status, and it remained unsecured until the following Monday morning.
29
Plaintiff does not deny this.30
4. On April 15, 2016, Queja emailed Plaintiff stating that since only he and Plaintiff
worked in security, and he needed office coverage since it was the busy hiring
season, he needed at least one week’s notice when possible for when she would
schedule appointments, and for emergencies, to be notified as soon as possible.31
Plaintiff does not deny this.32
5. As of 4:18pm on Friday, April 15, 2016, the last day of the pay period, Plaintiff
had not completed her time sheet. 33 Plaintiff submitted past time sheets late34.
Plaintiff does not deny this.35
6. On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff sent Queja a request for leave without an explanation,
and he responded to her on May 17, 2016, asking what type of appointment for
which she was seeking to take leave.
36
Plaintiff does not deny this.37
7. In order to telework, Plaintiff had to carry her 2.2 pound laptop from the office
to her residence. On May 19, 2016, Plaintiff’s telework agreement was rescinded
because her doctor issued a note that she could not lift more than .3 pounds.
After Plaintiff’s doctor clarified the restriction, Plaintiff’s telework agreement
was not reinstated because she failed to fulfill her obligations under the 2016

28 Dkt. 90 at 14.
29 Dkt. 84, Ex. D, Ex. E at 46-51.
30 Dkt. 90 at 14.
31 Dkt. 84, Ex. E at 14, Ex. F at 3.
32 Dkt. 90 at 14-15.
33 Dkt. 84, Ex. G at 1.
34 Dkt. 84, Ex. E at 16-18.
35 Dkt. 90 at 15.
36 Dkt. 84, Ex. E at 23, Ex. H at 1.
37 Dkt. 90 at 15-16.

settlement agreement that allowed her to telework. Plaintiff was never allowed
to telework as part of a reasonable accommodation.38
Plaintiff does not deny this.39
8. On June 30, 2016, Val -Deanna Mortensen emailed Laura Lasell stating that it
was her, Mortensen’s, fault that Plaintiff’s pay was delayed because Mortensen
made an error in the timekeeping system.
40
Plaintiff does not deny this. 41 Plaintiff adds that there was an initial error committed by
Laura Lasell and then a second by Val-Deanna Mortensen.42
9. It is standard practice for a supervisor in Human Resources in the Alaska Region
to enter his or her subordinate’s office when they are not there and leave work
in their office.43
Plaintiff offers no basis for denying this.44
10. On July 7, 2016, Plaintiff made a request to Trudy Hawkins that she be allowed
to visit a medical specialist.45 Hawkins spoke with an employee in the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs, and emailed Plaintiff on July 11, 2016, that
her request was approved.46
Plaintiff does not deny this.47
11. The rewriting of Plaintiff’s position description and the completion of a desk
audit would not impact her grade or pay.48

38 Dkt. 84, Ex. J at 26, Ex. E at 59, Ex. K at 5-6, Ex. F at 6-8, Ex. L at 9-10.
39 Dkt. 90 at 17-18.
40 Dkt. 84, Ex. M.
41 Dkt. 90 at 17.
42 Id.
43 Dkt. 84, Ex. N at 1.
44 Dkt. 90 at 17-18.
45 Dkt. 84, Ex. O at 1.
46 Id.
47 Dkt. 90 at 18.
48 Dkt. 84, Ex. P at 46-47.

Plaintiff superficially denies this but does not factually deny it. 49 Plaintiff argues that
rewriting her position description deprived her of opportunities for advancement and
“caused a deadlock[.]”50
12. Plaintiff requested Family and Medical Leave Act leave on February 17, 2017
for leave taken in 2016. 51 All dates she requested were credited as FMLA. 52
Because Plaintiff’s request was for leave already taken and the Agency must
process various FMLA requests, Plaintiff’s request was a lower priority than
those with leave upcoming.53
Plaintiff does not deny this.54 Plaintiff adds, without basis, that delays in her leave requests
being processed are attributable to retaliation.
13. In April of 2017 Plaintiff’s supervisor allowed her to switch her day off so she
could attend an April 25, 2017 briefing.55 Plaintiff showed up to the briefing and
upon learning it was an active shooter exercise, asked to be excused, and took a
day of annual leave to cover her absence. 56 Plaintiff was instructed to attend or
apply for annual leave like every other employee.57 The one other employee who
did not attend the active shooter training used annual leave.58
Plaintiff does not deny this, again merely characterizing Mr. Queja’s actions as
retaliation.59
14. On June 7, 2017, Trudy Hawkins told Plaintiff that Plaintiff needed to get the
background investigations to her as soon as possible because she had an
emergency at home and needed to leave soon. Hawkins was not Plaintiff’s

49 Dkt. 90 at 18.
50 Id.
51 Dkt. 84, Ex. Q at 4-5, 20-23.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Dkt. 90 at 19.
55 Dkt. 84, Ex. I.
56 Id.
57 Dkt. 84, Ex. S at 8, Ex. U, Ex. I, Ex. T at 4-5.
58 Dkt. 84, Ex. S at 8.
59 Dkt. 90 at 19.

supervisor but was responsible for performing backup on adjudicating
background investigations.60
Plaintiff does not deny this.61
15. Queja issued Plaintiff a notice of proposed suspension on September 27, 2017
for failing to keep her door open part way, unless she was engaged in
confidential activities. This was a progressive process of discipline that followed
(1) a letter of warning for being careless with personally identifying information,
(2) two letters of warning for failure to follow instructions, and (3) a letter of
reprimand for being careless with PII.
62 At the time Queja issued a notice of
proposed suspension, he did not have access to the medical information that
Plaintiff subsequently supplied to deciding official Christina Caswell that
resulted in the proposed suspension being mitigated to a warning.
63
Plaintiff does not deny this.64
16. On June 11, 2018, Queja held a meeting with Plaintiff and Olivia Colon so
Plaintiff’s OWCP forms could be timely processed so she could be paid. 65
Plaintiff was rude during the meeting and accused Colon of purposefully
delaying her OWCP pay and not knowing how to do her job. 66 When Plaintiff
wanted to leave, Queja directed her to stay so they could resolve the OWCP pay
issue and ensure Plaintiff was paid on time. 67 Plaintiff did not receive any
disciplinary action because of her conduct at the meeting.68
Plaintiff does not deny this.69

60 Dkt. 84, Ex. V at 5-6.
61 Dkt. 90 at 19-20.
62 Dkt. 84, Ex. W at 1-3.
63 Id. at 4-5.
64 Dkt. 90 at 20.
65 Dkt. 84, Ex. X.
66 Id.
67 Id.; Dkt. 84, Ex. Y.
68 Dkt. 84, Ex. X, Ex. A at 5-6.
69 Dkt. 90 at 20.

17. On June 14, 2018, Plaintiff went to Queja’s office after hours while he was using
a black magic marker for redactions.70
Plaintiff does not deny this.71
18. Plaintiff had an OWCP injury for her wrist, and her medical provider had her on
light/limited duty— she was compensated through OWCP. 72 Due to this,
Plaintiff could only work four hours a day. 73 Though Plaintiff claims she has
dysphonia, she does not have an OWCP injury for her throat/vocal cords. 74 On
October 4, 2018, Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation to travel to an
out-of-state training.75 The training required Plaintiff to sit in training for six to
eight hours per day. 76 On October 5, 2018, Plaintiff emailed a request for
assistance for obtaining a travel approval letter from her physician.77 On October
10, 2018, the Agency determined that the training would violate Plaintiff’s light
duty restrictions because she would have to sit for more than four hours a day
for both the training class and the flight. 78 Plaintiff received a limited waiver
from her physician to attend the eight hour a day training class. The agency
found the medical documentation alarming because it was inconsistent with the
current work light duty limitations.
79 Plaintiff’s job was not impacted by not
attending the October training, and the trainings are offered multiple times a
year.80
Plaintiff does not deny this.81
19. On October 18, 2018, Queja issued a memorandum to Plaintiff postponing her
scheduled travel and training because she had failed to provide additional

70 Dkt. 84, Ex. A at 7.
71 Dkt. 90 at 20-21.
72 Dkt. 84, Ex. Z at 4-6.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Dkt. 84, Ex. AA at 3, Ex. A at 12-15.
76 Id.; Dkt. 84, Ex. Z at 5.
77 Id.; Dkt. 84, Ex. AB at 2.
78 Dkt. 84, Ex. Z at 4-5.
79 Dkt. 84, Ex. AA, Ex. AC, Ex. Z at 5-6.
80 Dkt. 84, Ex. AC at 1-3, Ex. AD.
81 Dkt. 90 at 21-22.

requested information from her physician. 82 Queja offered to enroll her in the
first course in 2019.83 On November 13, 2018, the Agency requested additional
medical documentation from Plaintiff regarding her request for a reasonable
accommodation to attend an out-of-state training class, and how she was
permitted to do that but not sit in the office for more than four hours a day. 84
According to Defendants, Plaintiff never furnished medical documentation as
requested in the November 13, 2018 email.
Plaintiff does not deny this, adding only that the notice was given less than twenty-four
hours before departure.85
20. On November 23, 2018, Plaintiff submitted OWCP paperwork that contained an
error in it, and Olivia Colon submitted Plaintiff’s paperwork within timeframes
allowed by OWCP.86 Blaeuer stated that Plaintiff had to submit a weekly CA-7
form to receive OWCP compensation. 87 There was a mistaken belief that this
form could be completed before payroll was certified, but this was not correct,
and this caused frustration for multiple employees receiving OWCP benefits. 88
The necessary documents were submitted, the issue was resolved, and Plaintiff
received all of her compensation.
89
Plaintiff does not deny this.90
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “The party moving for summary judgment bears

82 Dkt. 84, Ex. AD, Ex. AE.
83 Dkt. 84, Ex. AD.
84 Dkt. 84, Ex. AE.
85 Dkt. 90 at 22.
86 Dkt. 84, Ex. AG at PDF 6.
87 Dkt. 84, Ex. Z at 11.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Dkt. 90 at 22-23.

the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial.” 91
However, “[w]hen the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party
need only point out ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.’”92 If the movant meets their burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”93 The non-moving party may
not rely on “mere allegations or denials”; rather, to reach the level of a genuine dispute, the
evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party.”94 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court views the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draws “all justifiable inferences” in the non-
moving party’s favor.
95
The Court examines discrimination and retaliation claims using the burden-shifting
framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973).
“Under that framework, an employee challenging an adverse employment action has the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination (or retaliation). The
burden then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory (or
nonretaliatory) reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer does so, then the
burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the reason given by the employer was

91 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
92 Id. (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325).
93 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
94 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986) (citations omitted).
95 Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)).

pretextual.”96 “[T]he plaintiff may establish pretext ‘either directly by persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’”97
Under the ADA, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”
98 “[T]he term ‘discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability’ includes [] not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business of such covered entity.”
99
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states “[n]o otherwise qualified individual
with a disability [] shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”100

96 Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
97 Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Texas Dept.
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
98 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
99 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
100 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

It is unlawful under the ADEA for an employer to “discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age.” 101 As with other discrimination and
retaliation claims, a plaintiff can show discrimination using the McDonnell Douglas
framework. A showing of but-for causation is required to establish that an employer took
an adverse action against the employee because of age.102
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Named defendants.
At the outset, the Court addresses the uncertainty in this action over the identity of
the named defendants. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s operative complaint lists a panoply
of NPS employees.103 Several of the employees against whom allegations are made no
longer work at the National Park Service.104 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d),
when a public official who is sued in their “official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise
ceases to hold office while the action is pending[, t]he officer’s successor is automatically
substituted as a party.” Doug Burgum has been substituted as a defendant for Walter
Cruickshank, who was substituted for Deb Haaland, as Secretary of the Interior. According
to the case caption, Joseph Blaeuer and Robyn Burch are not currently part of NPS.

101 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
102 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
103 Dkt. 51 at 1-2.
104 See, e.g., Docket Annotation dated January 24, 2025, substituting Deb Haaland for
Walter Cruickshank.

The United States filed the Motion as a defendant, but no party has made any
allegations in the moving papers concerning i) whether the accusations against the
individual defendants named are in connection with actions taken in their official capacity
ii) sovereign immunity 105 or iii) the appropriateness of substituting the United States as
defendant for the named defendants.
First, the Court construes pro se litigants’ complaints liberally.106 Plaintiff’s initial
complaint indicates she is filing a Bivens claim.107 However, in the Court’s order on May
29, 2024, the Court instructed Plaintiff to resubmit her amended complaint with the
knowledge that the resubmitted complaint would substitute the initial complaint entirely.108
The Ninth Circuit has “presumed that officials necessarily are sued in their personal
capacities where those officials are named in a complaint, even if the complaint does not
explicitly mention the capacity in which they are sued.”109
The Court construes th e operative complaint as a suit against the Secretary of the
Interior, as well as employees David Queja, Robyn Burch, and Joseph Blaeuer, in their
personal capacities.110

105 No party makes sovereign immunity arguments here. Title VII allows suits against the
federal government. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.
106 See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).
107 Dkt. 1 at PDF 2.
108 Dkt. 48 at 2 (“The amended complaint will replace the prior complaint in its entirety. ”
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15)).
109 Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999).
110 The Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by “[t]he United States[.]” Dkt. 84 at 1.
On reply, Defendants represent that they file for “Defendant Doug Burgum, Secretary,
Department of Interior (National Park Service), in his official capacity[.]” Dkt. 93 at 1. The

B. Failure to raise genuine issues of material fact.
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff fails to raise genuine issues of fact
sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Plaintiff tries to do so by reciting the actions taken
by her employer and identifying what she believes were the motivations for those actions.
However, Plaintiff’s own Response in Opposition re Motion for Summary Judgment
demonstrates that she does not meaningfully contest the Undisputed Facts as set forth by
Defendants. Her supplementations to those facts provide extensive commentary on why,
in her opinion, the NPS took the actions they did, and the negative ways in which those
actions impacted her. However, Plaintiff provides no factual basis, even making all
inferences in her favor, allowing the Court to conclude discriminatory intent was behind
these actions, and Plaintiff cannot establish that the Agency lacked legitimate reasons for
any of its actions.
C. Plaintiff cannot support a claim under Title VII.
1. Plaintiff fails to provide evidence establishing discrimination on the
basis of sex.
“[A] Title VII plaintiff alleging sex discrimination can establish a prima facie case
by showing that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position;
(3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated men were
treated more favorably, or her position was filled by a man.”
111

Court, given the context of the proceedings, construes the instant motion as covering all
defendants, whether sued in their personal or official capacities.
111 Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 777 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified, internal citation
omitted).

Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims are purely speculatory. Plaintiff claimed at
deposition that she was discriminated against based on being a woman and for having
previously filed a Merit Systems Protection Board claim.112 The parties do not dispute that
Plaintiff is a member of a protected class and that she is qualified for the position.
Plaintiff recites the following as possible examples of an adverse employment
action: being disallowed a promotion; being ejected from a training; being possibly the
oldest attendee in a particular training; not being selected for a promotion despite meeting
the minimum qualifications; not being given telework privileges; allegedly being followed
at work; allegedly being exposed to Sharpie markers; being asked by a supervisor whether
Plaintiff had a hair or medical appointment; the processing of Plaintiff’s FMLA request
being delayed.113
Many of these may not qualify as adverse employment actions. However, more to
the point, Plaintiff does not establish that similarly situated men were treated more
favorably, and she does not establish that her position was filled by a man. The closest
Plaintiff comes to establishing this is pointing to a single privilege – telework – of which
she was deprived while others were not.114 However, despite Plaintiff claiming that others
were granted telework privileges, which Defendants do not deny, Plaintiff fails to show
that the other employees were men who were similarly situated to Plaintiff.

112 Dkt. 84, Ex. R at 252:17-253:14.
113 Dkt. 90 at 3, 17, 20, 28, 42, 50.
114 Dkt. 84, Ex. R at 219:22-219:25.

Individuals who do similar work and display similar conduct are similarly
situated.115 Plaintiff points to one individual who was allegedly granted telework privileges
at NPS, which Defendants do not deny, but there is no evidence that he and Plaintiff had
similar jobs, and there is no evidence that he and Plaintiff displayed similar conduct. 116
a. Plaintiff fails to provide evidence establishing retaliation.
Establishing a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires showing (1)
involvement in a protected activity under the statute, (2) an adverse employment action,
and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.117
Plaintiff does not meet this burden.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity, at minimum, by filing
an EEOC complaint. 118 However, many of the actions taken by the Agency do not
necessarily amount to adverse employment actions. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to provide
a causal link between the protected activity and any alleged adverse employment action.119

115 See Vasquez v. City of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Individuals are
similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.”).
116 Dkt. 84, Ex. R at 218:23-219:21.
117 Emeldi v. Univ. of Oregon, 698 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 2012).
118 Dkt. 24 at 22.
119 Dkt. 90 at 38, 53 (repeating the conclusory allegation that “[t]he retaliation factor is
crucial.”). The most Plaintiff can muster is a conclusory allegation that a supervisor broke
a promise to her about not requiring her to take leave during a training she wished not to
attend. Dkt. 90 at 19. Even if true that Defendant Queja broke this promise to Plaintiff, and
even if true that it were retaliatory, this would not be sufficiently connected to a
meaningfully adverse employment action.

b. Plaintiff fails to provide evidence establish ing a hostile work
environment.
The Court examines three factors on a hostile work environment claim involving
allegations of sexual harassment: 1) whether the Plaintiff was “subjected to verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature; 2) whether the conduct was unwelcome; and 3)
whether the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment.”120
Plaintiff describes an awkward interaction in which she circled around Queja while
he was sitting at his desk, he stood up, and grabbed her by the arm, ostensibly to direct her
away from his workplace. Plaintiff provides no explanation for having entered h er
supervisor’s personal space or placing herself behind him, and it is understandable why
both parties would feel uncomfortable in a situation like this. Nevertheless, while both
parties may have engaged in conduct that was unwelcome, Plaintiff does not establish that
she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature adequately pervasive
or severe to alter the terms of her employment or create an abusive environment. In short,
the conduct described does not meet the standard for a hostile work environment claim.
The same is true for the other alleged incidents that Plaintiff claims contributed to a
hostile work environment, which are basically tantamount to Queja having walked too
close to Plaintiff on a few occasions over the course of the year. These latter examples ring
of cherry-picking or even fully manufactured disputes for the purpose of creating a pattern

120 Okonowsky v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation modified, internal
citation omitted).

of unwelcome behavior instead of only one instance. Even if true, and drawing all
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that these events changed the
terms or conditions of her employment.
2. Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for race discrimination.
As discussed above, Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed as to all claims except sex
discrimination.121 Plaintiff points to a single instance of alleged racial discrimination, in
which defendant Queja referred to her as a “scape monkey” in April 2016. Regardless of
whether this was a racially motivated comment or a botched attempt to use the common
idiom “scapegoat,” Plaintiff still fails to establish the required elements for a Title VII
claim based on racial discrimination. Even assuming this comment was racially motivated,
a single comment by one supervisor does not amount to discrimination.
122 More
importantly, Plaintiff fails to link this to any adverse employment action taken against her.
Plaintiff claims to have been subjected to another instance of racial animosity when
asked whether an appointment she was planning to attend was a haircut or medical
appointment. As Defendants state, personal leave and sick leave are different ways for
federal employees to legitimately take time away from work. Without Plaintiff having
described what kind of appointment she needed to attend, it is fair for a supervisor to
inquire into the nature of the requested leave. Moreover, haircuts are not medical
appointments. Additionally, at deposition, Plaintiff described her own hairstyle as an

121 Dkt. 34 at 8.
122 See Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990)) (rejecting the
argument that a single use of the term “brother” could give rise to a discrimination claim
because “‘[s]tray’ remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”).

“ethnic haircut.”123 None of this is persuasive that the conversation surrounding the nature
of Plaintiff’s appointment rises to racially motivated activity, and even if it did, Plaintiff’s
claim fails for the same reasons set forth above.
D. Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim under the Rehabilitation Act or the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
As discussed above, Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed as to all claims except sex
discrimination.124 In any event, Plaintiff provides evidence that she suffers from dysphonia,
a condition which makes it difficult or even impossible for her to speak sometimes. 125
Plaintiff makes a compelling case that she suffers from this genuine disability and that it
has caused her distress.126 What Plaintiff does not do, however, is connect the disability to
any discrimination experienced because of it. Plaintiff makes limited allegations regarding
any request for accommodation, much less the denial of any accommodation. Her
arguments in opposition are two short paragraphs addressing i) the length of time that she
has had this disability and ii) the extent to which it has interfered with life activities.
E. Plaintiff is unable to sustain a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.

As discussed above, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s ADEA claims, along with her
Title VII sex discrimination claims, in its January 24, 2024 Order partially granting

123 The Court acknowledges that ethnicity and race are not interchangeable, although they
often overlap and are used interchangeably in everyday conversation.
124 Dkt. 34 at 8.
125 Dkt. 27-5 at 11.
126 Dkt. 51 at 10-11.

defendants’ motion to dismiss. 127 All claims except the sex discrimination claims were
dismissed with prejudice. 128 While the January 24, 2024 Order expressly allows for the
refiling of Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims only, for the sake of thoroughness, the
Court addresses all of Plaintiff’s claims here. Plaintiff’s scattered allegations regarding age
discrimination are unsupported. 129 For the same reasons Plaintiff cannot sustain her other
claims, she cannot sustain a claim under the ADEA. Speculation that Plaintiff was treated
differently due to her age, without evidence to support it, is not enough to create a triable
issue of fact.
F. Plaintiff cannot show the Agency lacked legitimate reasons for its actions.
Defendants set forth the events complained of in Plaintiff’s EEOC appeal. 130
Defendants explain why each of these actions is legitimate, and Plaintiff offers no basis
upon which the Court can conclude otherwise. Plaintiff has not made a compelling prima
facie case of sex discrimination. Even if she had, the Agency shows that it had legitimate
reasons for its actions. Furthermore, Plaintiff provides no evidence that these motivations
were pretextual.

127 Dkt. 34.
128 Id. at 8.
129 Dkt. 84 at 18, 22, 30.
130 Dkt. 6-1; Dkt. 84 at 28-41.

1. Non-discriminatory reason for Queja directing Plaintiff to remain at a
June 11, 2018 meeting.
The meeting occurred, according to Defendant, so that Plaintiff’s OWCP paperwork
could be processed, allowing her to be paid. 131 There is nothing discriminatory about
requiring Plaintiff to stay at a meeting, and she provides no reason to believe otherwise.
2. Non-discriminatory reason for Queja instructing Plaintiff to meet with
him in his office after he used a Sharpie.
Defendant Queja was using a marker in his own office.132 There is nothing unusual
about using markers at work, and if Plaintiff wished not to be exposed to them, she could
have avoided Queja’s office.
3. Non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff being prevented from
attending a training class on October 4, 2018/postponing her travel on
October 19, 2018.
The Agency argues that it was doing its best to follow Plaintiff’s physician’s
recommendations limiting her to light duty and limited work.133 Despite Plaintiff obtaining
a waiver from her physician so that she could attend the training, the Agency elected to
preclude her from this particular training, rescheduling her to a later date. 134
On opposition, Plaintiff attacks the Agency’s motivations for taking this action,
conveying her belief that the Agency wished to deprive her of training received by her
peers. Plaintiff could be correct that one or more of her supervisors were so motivated, but
even if true, it still would not show that NPS lacked a legitimate basis for its decision.

131 Dkt. 84, Ex. A at 5-6; Ex. X.
132 Dkt. 84, Ex. A at 7.
133 Dkt. 84 at 29.
134 Id.

4. Nondiscriminatory reason for failing to submit documentation for
Plaintiff to receive OWCP payments on November 23, 2018.
At most, if true, this would entitle Plaintiff to damages for the money she did not
receive and was entitled to, but the Agency states that “[t]he necessary documents were
submitted and the issue was resolved.”135 Plaintiff does not contest this.
5. Nondiscriminatory reason for failing to respond to her February 21,
2017 request for FMLA leave.
NPS alleges the delay was a result of Plaintiff herself failing to provide a needed
medical certification, and Plaintiff does not contest this, arguing that the delay is
attributable to “[r]etaliation[.]”136 In any event, the leave in question was for leave already
taken, according to Defendants, which Plaintiff does not deny. Employees are not entitled
to retroactive FMLA leave.137 The Agency provided Plaintiff with retroactive FMLA leave
anyway.
6. Nondiscriminatory reason for sharing medical records.
Despite discovery being complete, Plaintiff is unable to show that any of her
medical records were released to anyone other than those who were authorized and needed
to have them for the purpose of assessing reasonable accommodations. 138

135 Dkt. 84 at 30.
136 Dkt. 84 at 30; Dkt. 90 at 50.
137 5 C.F.R. § 630.1203(b) (“An employee may not retroactively invoke his or her
entitlement to family and medical leave.”).
138 Ms. Yelder states that she shared her medical information with an Equal Employment
Opportunity investigator and expresses frustration at Defendant Swank having done the
same without Plaintiff’s permission. Dkt. 90 at 50-51. An employer may share otherwise
confidential medical information of an employee with government officials investigating
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B)((iii)

7. Plaintiff’s June 7, 2017 adjudication request addressed in a defensive
and condescending tone.
Defensive and condescending workplace communications, while frowned upon, do
not alone meet the bar for Title VII or any other discrimination claims.
8. Nondiscriminatory reason for supervisor, on April 25, 2017,
instructing her to use annual leave after previously agreeing to allow
her to switch her regular day off to attend a mandatory training.
Plaintiff wished not to attend the mandatory training. 139 On opposition, Plaintiff
explains her disappointment that Queja initially agreed to allow her to skip it but reversed
course after discussing it with Ms. Burch. 140 However, this alone does not erase the
Agency’s legitimate basis for instructing Plaintiff to take leave for time she wished not to
work.
9. Nondiscriminatory reason for issuing Plaintiff a proposed suspension
on September 27, 2017.
The Agency states that it engaged in progressive discipline against Plaintiff for
failing to follow instructions and provides documentation in support of its claim. 141
Plaintiff provides no reason to believe the Agency lacked a legitimate basis for its actions.
10. Nondiscriminatory reason the Agency responded in the manner it did
to Plaintiff’s March 7, 2016 request to use sick leave.
The Agency states that, Blaeuer, Plaintiff’s acting supervisor, directed Plaintiff to
take sick leave when she had a fever of 102 degrees Fahrenheit and wished not to come to

(“government officials investigating compliance with this chapter shall be provided
relevant information on request”).
139 Dkt. 90 at 51.
140 Id.
141 Dkt. 84, Ex. W.

the office.142 On opposition, Plaintiff expresses that she was upset by this and wished to be
permitted to telework. 143 Plaintiff makes no claim that sick leave was unavailable to her
for any reason, and it is legitimate for an employer to deny an employee’s telework request.
11. Nondiscriminatory reason for telling Plaintiff she needed prior
approval before making medical appointments on April 14, 2016 and
June 10, 2016.
NPS states that Queja requested that Plaintiff provide advance notice for any
upcoming medical appointments on April 14 and June 10, 2016 because the spring and
summer are unusually busy times of the year. 144 Plaintiff’s response is: “The retaliation
factor is crucial. Mr. Queja controlled when I was allowed to seek medical treatment. He
demanded I inform him before scheduling doctor’s appointments when doctors do not
schedule their appointments around a supervisor.”145
If true that Defendant controlled when Plaintiff could or could not make medical
appointments, that would be a disturbing overreach, but Plaintiff provides no evidence of
this. Plaintiff alleges this, without basis, and while the parties do not specify how much
advance notice Defendant wanted from Plaintiff, it is legitimate for an employer to request
some advance notice for scheduled medical leave.

142 Dkt. 84, Ex. C, Ex. J at 7-9.
143 Dkt. 90 at 52-53.
144 Dkt. 84 at 32-33.
145 Dkt. 90 at 53 (formatting modified).

12. Nondiscriminatory reason for accusing Plaintiff of not doing her
timecard on April 15, 2016.
Defendant Queja reminded Plaintiff to complete her timecard because she had failed
to complete her prior timecard on time. 146 Moreover, despite failing to complete her
timecard on time again, the administrative officer verified her timecard so that she could
get paid on time.147 Plaintiff presents no evidence that the Agency lacked a legitimate basis
for reminding her to complete her timecard on time.
13. Nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s supervisor chastising her on
April 18, 2016.
Plaintiff attributes difficulties logging into a new online portal to workplace
discrimination without setting forth any evidence to support her claim. 148 The Agency
states that all staff were required to use this platform and that Defendant Queja emailed all
of his staff informing them how to use it. 149 Directing Plaintiff, along with all other
employees, to use an online platform mandatory for all employees is not workplace
discrimination, and in the absence of any evidence, Plaintiff’s difficulties using the
platform do not change that.

146 Dkt. 84, Ex. G at 1, Ex. E at 16.
147 Dkt. 84 at 33.
148 Dkt. 90 at 54 (“In my opinion, this incident shows that Mr. Queja was told or given
instructions not to train me. He did not want to help me in this matter.” (formatting
modified)).
149 Dkt. 84, Ex. E at 19-20.

14. Nondiscriminatory reason for Queja asking Plaintiff if she had a hair
or medical appointment on May 16, 2016.
This has been addressed above. The Court acknowledges that this inquiry could
have been framed better, e.g., Defendant Queja could have simply confirmed whether the
appointment was medical or not. Nevertheless, a single inquiry that goes beyond the
bounds of normal supervisor-supervisee exchanges regarding leave time, or even a single
microaggression, does not amount to workplace discrimination.
15. Nondiscriminatory reason for assigning additional duties on June 1,
2016.
The reward for good work is often more work. There is nothing discriminatory about
assigning an employee additional duties, particularly when the work assigned is
appropriate for her. Plaintiff gives no reason to believe that requiring her to do the
additional work assigned was in any way against medical advice. Plaintiff claims that this
was designed to injure her and not in conformity with medical guidance, but she provides
no evidence to that effect.
16. Nondiscriminatory reason for delaying timesheet certification and pay
on June 28, 2016 and July 13, 2016.
NPS states that a payroll error caused Plaintiff’s pay to be delayed and that the
situation was rectified within a few days of the incident.150 Plaintiff believes that the delay
in receiving her pay was deliberate and racially motivated, but she provides no evidence of
this.151 While receiving pay later than expected is unfortunate, at most, this would entitle

150 Dkt. 84, Ex. P at 20.
151 Dkt. 90 at 55.

Plaintiff to the pay she has already received anyway. While NPS may not have had a
legitimate reason to delay paying Plaintiff, there was no reason to believe this was not an
accident. In any event, Plaintiff cannot credibly claim that she was harmed due to
workplace discrimination in connection with this because she was in fact paid. In addition,
Plaintiff brings no other such incidents to the Court’s attention.
17. Nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s supervisor entering her
office on July 7, 2016/leaving documents on her chair while she was
on light duty.
The Agency explains that Defendant Queja enters Plaintiff’s office because they
both work in Human Resources, Plaintiff’s office must therefore remain locked while she
is not in it, and Queja carries files to her office because Plaintiff has a workplace lifting
restriction.152 Plaintiff does not contest any of this. She states that this made her feel as
though her privacy was invaded, that Defendant’s intent was to intimidate, and that entry
into her office was investigative for the purpose of trying to find reasons to terminate her
employment.
The Agency provides a legitimate basis for entering Plaintiff’s office. In the absence
of the lifting restriction, there could be a workaround, but because of it, Defendant not only
has a legitimate basis for entering Plaintiff’s office, but there appear to be few, if any,
alternatives.

152 Dkt. 84, Ex. E at 32, Ex. N.

18. Nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s supervisor asking her to
leave a training class on July 12, 2016.
NPS states that “Plaintiff was not on the roster to attend the class.” 153 This alone is
a sufficient basis for Defendant Queja to prohibit Plaintiff from attending the class, but in
addition, she was behind on her work. 154 Plaintiff argues that this humiliated her but
provides no basis upon which the Court could conclude that this was not a legitimate
employer prerogative.
19. Nondiscriminatory reason for providing Plaintiff with April 11, 2016
letter of warning.
The Agency issued Plaintiff a written warning for failing to secure an HR file
cabinet containing Personally Identifiable Information. 155 Plaintiff alleges that she “tried
to inform [her] supervisor about” a broken lock, presumably in connection with this
incident, but she provides no emails or other documentation of this attempt. 156 In the
absence of this, the Court cannot conclude that NPS lacked a legitimate basis for issuing
this warning, regardless of whether this amounts to an adverse employment action.
20. Nondiscriminatory reason Plaintiff was not selected for GS-07/12
position on May 24, 2016.
The Agency had another outstanding GS-12 hiring certificate and chose to use that
for two qualified candidates instead of hiring someone at the GS-07 level. 157 In addition,
upon Defendant Blaeuer checking Plaintiff’s references, it was determined that she had not

153 Dkt. 84 at 35.
154 Dkt. 84, Ex. E at 36-37.
155 Dkt. 84, Ex. P at 39, Ex. E at 46-47.
156 Dkt. 90 at 57.
157 Dkt. 84, Ex. J at 21-22.

performed work she claimed to have performed, but the Agency took no disciplinary
action.158
Making hiring choices is a legitimate employer action, and Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction
with not being selected does not amount to discrimination.
21. Nondiscriminatory reason for denying reasonable accommodations on
April 20, 21, 29, and June 10, 2016.
Defendant admits it denied Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation requests.159 While
Defendant’s explanation for doing so is a little mysterious in that the reason for doing so
shifts, the Agency has some amount of discretion in this matter.160
First, employers may deny reasonable accommodation requests that would prevent
an employee from fulfilling the essential duties of their job. 161 Because Plaintiff’s job
functions included issuing badges and other tasks requiring her presence at the office, full-
time telework would have prevented her from performing the essential functions of her
job.162 Second, it is legitimate for employers to request additional documentation to support
a reasonable accommodation request if the documentation provided is not sufficiently
detailed to allow the employer to make a decision. 163 Third, while the Agency did not

158 Dkt. AI at 18-19.
159 Dkt. 84 at 37-38.
160 Id.
161 Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2012)
(affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of employer against neonatal intensive care
unit nurse who sought exemption from employer’s attendance policy).
162 Dkt. 84, Ex. E at 56.
163 See Brooks v. Agate Res., Inc., No. 6:15- CV-00983-MK, 2019 WL 2635594, at *8 (D.
Or. Mar. 25, 2019) (“Defendant would have been well within its rights to request further
information about Plaintiff’s alleged disability.”), report and recommendation adopted,

accommodate Plaintiff in the sense that it allowed her to telework full-time, as
recommended by her physician, it did allow her to telework part-time, albeit as part of a
settlement agreement rather than reasonable accommodation. 164 Finally, Defendant
alleges, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff never responded to Defendant’s offer
to move her office within the Agency’s building.165 Employees are obligated to engage in
the interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation, and at the point at which
Plaintiff stopped responding, she stopped engaging in the interactive process. Without ever
having resumed it, it is fair to conclude that she abandoned the interactive process.
22. Nondiscriminatory reason for rescinding telework on May 19, 2016.
Defendant argues that rescinding Plaintiff’s telework was a legitimate action
because it was not part of a reasonable accommodation but a settlement.166 The settlement
agreement required Plaintiff to complete certain tasks within a particular timeframe. 167
According to Defendant, Plaintiff failed to comply with the terms of this agreement. 168

No. 6:15-CV-000983-MK, 2019 WL 2156955 (D. Or. May 14, 2019), aff’d, 836 F. App’x
471 (9th Cir. 2020) (recognizing right of employer to request additional documentation in
connection with reasonable accommodation when related to needs of business); see also
Chandler v. DeJoy, 714 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1142 (D. Ariz. 2024) (reasoning that both
employer and employee must participate in the interactive process of finding an appropriate
reasonable accommodation), aff’ d, No. 24-1265, 2025 WL 1404947 (9th Cir. May 15,
2025).
164 Dkt. 84 at 37-38.
165 Dkt. 84 at 37.
166 Dkt. 84 at 38.
167 Dkt. 84, Ex. L ¶ 24.
168 Dkt. 84, Ex. AI at 30-31.

Additionally, Plaintiff submitted an OWCP form from her doctor on May 19, which
indicated she was unable to lift more than .3 pounds. 169 Plaintiff’s government-issued
laptop weighs more than this, so Defendant Queja stopped Plaintiff from teleworking. 170
After the restriction was lifted, Defendant did not reinstate Plaintiff’s telework because she
was not in compliance with the parties’ settlement agreement.171
Plaintiff does not meaningfully contest this, admitting that she was unable to
complete her work due to the worsening of her medical condition.172 The Agency therefore
had a legitimate basis to revoke Plaintiff’s telework arrangement.
23. Nondiscriminatory reason for going into Plaintiff’s office when she
was on LWOP status.
Defendant provides at least two legitimate reasons for entering Plaintiff’s office
while she was on LWOP status. First, Defendants Burch and Queja moved fingerprinting
equipment into her office because she would be performing fingerprinting duties. 173
Second, Plaintiff’s office contained unsecured documents containing PII intermingled with
personal items, so Defendant Queja separated Plaintiff’s personal items and placed them
in a box.174 The Agency has demonstrated legitimate bases for taking this action.

169 Dkt. 84, Ex. E at 59.
170 Dkt. 84, Ex. E at 59.
171 Dkt. 84 at 38-39.
172 Dkt. 90 at 60.
173 Dkt. 84, Ex. AK at 1.
174 Dkt. 84, Ex. AK at 2.

24. Nondiscriminatory reason for supervisor requesting information on
February 10, 2017 that Plaintiff believed was covered under HIPAA.
Defendant requested medical documentation to support Plaintiff’s request for leave,
which was allegedly related to a prior workplace injury. 175 In addition, Plaintiff provides
no reason to believe that this was in violation of HIPAA. Plaintiff provides no way for the
Court to find that the agency lacked a legitimate basis for this action, arguing only that she
was “repeatedly singled out.”176
25. Nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff not receiving 2016
performance appraisal by March 2017.
Plaintiff returned to work on January 17, 2017 after a lengthy absence.177 Defendant
Queja provided Plaintiff with an Employee Performance Appraisal Plan in March because,
in the interim, he was seeking advice from in -house counsel. 178 Plaintiff again does not
connect this to any harm she suffered, and the Court cannot conclude that the Agency
lacked a legitimate basis for the delay.
26. Nondiscriminatory reason for placing a sign on Plaintiff’s door to
indicate whether she was available on February 10, 2017.
Defendant states that Defendant Queja required Plaintiff to indicate her availability
with a sign on her door because Plaintiff’s work requires her to be available to assist
employees, but she works with the door closed and lights off. 179 The Agency had a
legitimate basis for directing Plaintiff to indicate her availability, particularly because her

175 Dkt. 84, Ex. AL at 2.
176 Dkt. 90 at 62.
177 Dkt. 84 at 40.
178 Dkt. 84, Ex. AL at 12-13.
179 Dkt. 84, Ex. AL at 24.

work requires her to interact with other employees and, due to a reasonable
accommodation, she works with her door closed and the lights off.
27. Nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting reconsideration of Plaintiff’s
2015 annual appraisal.
Plaintiff formally requested reconsideration of her 2015 evaluation. 180 Defendant
denied this request because Plaintiff failed to submit documentation warranting it. 181 The
Agency had a legitimate reason for denying Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, and
Plaintiff provides no evidence to the contrary.
V. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of
Defendant. For the vast majority of Plaintiff’s claims, she has failed to make out a prima
facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, or the Rehabilitation
Act, to include retaliation, race discrimination, and sex discrimination. Concerning the few
instances in which Plaintiff may have suffered an adverse employment action, even if the
circumstances did allow an inference of discrimination, NPS has shown legitimate bases

180 Dkt. 84, Ex. AO at 5.
181 Dkt. 84, Ex. B.

for each of its actions taken. Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that any of these actions is
merely a pretext for discrimination.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 18th day of May, 2026.

/s/ Aaron Christian Peterson
Aaron Christian Peterson
United States District Judge

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