govinfo:USCOURTS-akd-3_25-cv-00065-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 
 
 
PHYLLIS LOUISE W.,1 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 v. 
 
FRANK BISIGNANO, 
Commissioner of Social Security, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
DECISION AND ORDER 
On or about January 13, 2016, self-represented Phyllis Louise W. (“Plaintiff”) 
protectively filed an application under Title II of the Social Security Act, 2 with an 
alleged onset date beginning June 3, 2002.3 Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court 
 
1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c)(2)(B) 
and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case 
Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Memorandum, 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. 
2 Title II of the Social Security Act provides benefits to disabled individuals who are 
insured by virtue of working and paying Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) 
taxes for a certain amount of time. Title XVI of the Social Security Act is a needs-
based program funded by general tax revenues designed to help disabled 
individuals who have low or no income. Plaintiff brings claims under Title II only. 
Although each program is governed by a separate set of regulations, the 
regulations governing disability determinations are substantially the same for both 
programs. Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501 –1599 (governing disability 
determinations under Title II) with 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.901–999d (governing disability 
determinations under Title XVI). For convenience, the Court cites the regulations 
governing disability determinations under both titles. 
3 Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 249, 251. The ALJ’s decision cites December 17, 
2015 as the application date, but the record includes an Application Summary and 
Amendments to Application dated January 13, 2016. A.R. 661. Plaintiff ’s 
amendment to her application changed the alleged onset date from March 1, 2002 

 
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on April 1, 2025. 4 Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Opening Brief asks the Court to 
reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand for the payment of benefits. 5 
The Commissioner filed the Administrative Record as his Answer and a Response 
Brief.6 No reply brief was filed. Oral argument was not requested by either party 
and was not necessary to the Court’s decision. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
an appeal from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.
7 For the 
reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s request for relief at Docket 20 is DENIED and 
the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A decision by the Commissioner to deny disability benefits will not be 
overturned unless it is either not supported by substantial evidence or is based 
upon legal error.8 “Substantial evidence” has been defined by the Supreme Court 
as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”9 Such evidence must be “more than a mere scintilla but not 
 
to June 3, 2002. A.R. 249. 
4 Docket 1. 
5 Docket 20 (Plaintiff’s Brief) at 4 (“[T]he claimant has significant anxiety about the 
hearing decision. If appropriate, I ask you to grant this claim on the record.”). 
6 Docket 15 (Notice of Lodging Admin. Record); Docket 21 (Commissioner’s Br.). 
As of December 1, 2022, the Commissioner’s “answer may be limited to a certified 
copy of the administrative record[.]” See Fed. R. Civ. P., Supp. R. 4(b) of Soc. Sec. 
Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (effective Dec. 1, 2022). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
8 Matney ex rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 
Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
9 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of 

 
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necessarily a preponderance.”10 In reviewing the agency’s determination, a court 
“considers the evidence in its entirety, weighing both the evidence that supports 
and that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.”11 “If the evidence is susceptible to 
more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be 
upheld.”12 A reviewing court may only consider the reasons provided by the ALJ 
in the disability determination and “may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which 
[s]he did not rely.” 13 An ALJ’s decision will not be reversed if it is based on 
“harmless error,” meaning that the error “is inconsequential to the ultimate 
nondisability determination, or that, despite the legal error, the agency’s path may 
reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than 
ideal clarity.”
14 The ALJ has a “special duty to fully and fairly develop the record 
and to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered . . . even when the 
claimant is represented by counsel.”
15 
 
New York v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 
10 Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
11 Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). 
12 Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation 
omitted). 
13 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
14 Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
15 Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brown v. Heckler, 
713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

 
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DETERMINING DISABILITY 
The Social Security Act (“the Act”) provides for the payment of disability 
insurance benefits (“DIB”) to individuals who have contributed to the Social 
Security program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability.16 In addition, 
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) may be available to individuals who do not 
have insured status under the Act but who are age 65 or older, blind, or disabled.
17 
Disability is defined in the Act as follows: 
[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected 
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
18 
The Act further provides: 
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his 
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity 
that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national 
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate 
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for 
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For 
purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), 
“work which exists in the national economy” means work which exists 
in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives 
or in several regions of the country.
19 
 
 
 
16 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). 
17 42 U.S.C. § 1381. 
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A). 
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). 

 
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The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining 
disability within the meaning of the Act. 20 A claimant bears the burden of proof at 
steps one through four to make a prima facie showing of disability.21 If a claimant 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof then shifts to the agency at 
step five. 22 The Commissioner can meet this burden in two ways: (1) by the 
testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by reference to the Medical- Vocational 
Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. 23 The steps, and the 
ALJ’s findings in this case (in italics), are as follows: 
Step 1. Determine whether the claimant is involved in “substantial gainful 
activity.”24 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements 
of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2011.25 The ALJ also determined that 
Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity from June 2006 to January 2007 , 
but she did not engage in substantial gainful activity after January 2007. 26 
Step 2. Determine whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment 
or combination of impairments. A severe impairment significantly limits a 
 
20 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 
21 Treichler v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1096 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(citing Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Tackett 
v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 
22 Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1096 n.1; Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. 
23 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101. 
24 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). 
25 A.R. 663. 
26 A.R. 664. 

 
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claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities and does not 
consider age, education, or work experience. The severe impairment or 
combination of impairments must satisfy the twelve -month duration 
requirement.
27 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff ’s right knee osteoarthritis was a 
severe impairment.28 The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s chronic pain syndrome and 
meniscus damage in conjunction with Plaintiff’s right knee osteoarthritis.29 
Step 3. Determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments 
meet(s) or equal(s) the severity of any of the listed impairments found in 20 C.F.R. 
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, precluding substantial gainful activity. If the 
impairment(s) is(are) the equivalent of any of the listed impairments, and meet(s) 
the duration requirement, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If 
not, the evaluation goes on to the fourth step.
30 The ALJ determined that, through 
the date last insured, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
31 
Residual Functional Capacity. Before proceeding to step four, a claimant’s 
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is assessed.32 Once determined, the RFC is 
 
27 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 
28 A.R. 664. 
29 A.R. 664. 
30 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 
31 A.R. 664. 
32 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). 

 
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used at both step four and step five. An RFC assessment is a determination of 
what a claimant is able to do on a sustained basis despite the limitations from her 
impairments, including impairments that are not severe.
33 The ALJ determined 
that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with 
the following limitations: sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday; standing up 
to one hour at one time for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday with normal 
breaks; walking up to 15 minutes at one time for a total of one hour in an eight -
hour workday with normal breaks; occasionally performing right foot control 
operations; pushing and pull ing with her upper extremities without limit; 
occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, balancing with a handheld assistive device, 
stooping, kneel ing, crouching and crawl ing; never climbing ladders, ropes, or 
scaffolds; avoiding all unprotected heights; and avoiding concentrated exposure to 
hazardous machinery and operational control of moving machinery.
34 
Step 4. Determine whether the claimant is capable of performing past 
relevant work. At this point, the analysis considers whether past relevant work 
requires the performance of work -related activities that are precluded by the 
claimant’s RFC. If the claimant can still do her past relevant work, the claimant is 
deemed not to be disabled.35 Otherwise, the evaluation process moves to the fifth 
 
33 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 
34 A.R. 665. 
35 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). 

 
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and final step.36 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past 
relevant work.37 
Step 5. Determine whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the 
national economy in view of her age, education, and work experience, and in light 
of the RFC. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is considered 
disabled.38 Based on the vocational expert (“VE”)’s testimony and through the 
date last insured, the ALJ determined that there were light work jobs existing in 
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including 
router (DOT # 222.587-038, light work with SVP of 2); routing clerk (DOT # 
222.687-022, light work with a SVP of 2); and marker (DOT # 209.587 -034, light 
work with a SVP of 2).
39 The ALJ also determined that there were also sedentary 
jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could 
perform, including cutter/paster (DOT # 249.587 -014) and surveillance system 
monitor (DOT # 379.367-010).40 
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled on or before the date last 
insured of March 31, 2011.41 
 
36 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 
37 A.R. 671. 
38 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 
39 A.R. 672. 
40 A.R. 673. 
41 A.R. 673. 

 
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PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff was 46 years old and considered a “younger individual” as of the 
date last insured. 42 Plaintiff alleges that she was injured on June 3 or 6, 2002, 
when a heavy box fell onto her right knee while working for the U.S. Army Signal 
Command at Fort Richardson, Alaska. 43 Plaintiff previously applied for disability 
in 2003, which the SSA denied on June 5, 2006 and Plaintiff did not appeal.44 
Plaintiff went back to work as an office clerk at Hope Community Resources from 
approximately December 2005 to January 2007, working at a substantial gainful 
level from June 2006 to January 2007.45 
After reviewing Plaintiff’s application, the SSA determined that Plaintiff did 
not qualify for Title II benefits.46 Plaintiff exhausted the administrative process and 
appealed to this Court.47 The Court vacated the Commissioner’s final decision and 
remanded the case to the SSA for further proceedings on September 3, 2019 .48 
Accordingly, the Appeals Council ordered the ALJ to reconsider the medical 
 
42 A.R. 671; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c). 
43 A.R. 634. 
44 A.R. 661. 
45 A.R. 301, 664. 
46 A.R. 118, 121–25. A claimant must be insured in order to establish eligibility for 
Title II benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(3), 423(a), (c). 
47 Docket 1 at 1, Williams v. Saul, No. 3:18-cv-00131-SLG, 2019 WL 13235793, at 
*1 (D. Alaska Sept. 3, 2019). 
48 A.R. 769–803. 

 
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opinion evidence from Drs. R. Matison White, M.D., T. Noah Laufer, M.D., and 
David McGuire, M.D.49 
On November 18, 2020, the ALJ held a hearing on remand. 50 Plaintiff 
testified telephonically with representation at the hearing.51 On January 22, 2021, 
the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision.52 The record also shows that Plaintiff’s 
former attorney filed written exceptions to the ALJ decision on June 29, 2021. 53 
Almost four years later, the Appeals Council initially denied the written exceptions 
as untimely on March 21, 2025.54 
Plaintiff filed her complaint with the Court on April 1, 2025. 55 On April 22, 
2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to submit evidence of a final decision by the 
Appeals Council by June 23, 2025.
56 On the same day, the Appeals Council 
granted Plaintiff’s request for additional time to file her written exceptions. 57 On 
June 2, 2025, the Appeals Council considered Plaintiff’s written exceptions to the 
ALJ’s decision, found no basis for changing the ALJ’s decision, and declined to 
 
49 A.R. 806. 
50 A.R. 684–733. 
51 A.R. 705–26. 
52 A.R. 661–673. 
53 A.R. 634–37. 
54 A.R. 629. 
55 Docket 1. 
56 Docket 5. 
57 A.R. 626. 

 
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assume jurisdiction.58 Plaintiff submitted the Appeals Council’s order on June 25, 
2025, at Docket 6-1. 
Although Plaintiff filed her complaint before the Appeals Council denied 
review of her claim, she took the last step in the administrative review process by 
requesting review by the Appeals Council.59 Moreover, the Commissioner has not 
alleged that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and filed an 
Answer at Docket 15.60 Consequently, to the extent that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 
her administrative remedies by filing her complaint before the Appeals Council 
issued its decision, such failure is waived.
61 
A. The Medical Record 
Because this case has returned to the Court on remand and neither party 
disputes the Court’s previous account of the relevant portion of the record ,
62 the 
Court limits its summary of the record to the following relevant medical records and 
opinions: 
 
58 A.R. 619–20. 
59 See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000) (“The Commissioner rightly 
concedes that petitioner exhausted administrative remedies by requesting review 
by the Council. Petitioner thus obtained a final decision, and nothing in § 405(g) 
or the regulations implementing it bars judicial review of her claims.”). 
60 Docket 21. 
61 See Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 918, 921 (9 th Cir. 1993) (citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976)) (“The exhaustion requirement . . . is not 
jurisdictional, and thus, is waivable by either the Secretary or the courts.”). 
62 A.R. 665, 976. 

 
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On January 27, 2004, David McGuire, M.D., at Alaska Orthopedic 
Specialists, Inc., wrote a letter to an attorney regarding Plaintiff’s condition at the 
time. He noted that Plaintiff had right knee surgery on November 12, 2002. 63 Dr. 
McGuire opined that Plaintiff had “permanent damage to her knee and it would be 
best if she retire.” 64 He also opined that “her job duties have worsened her 
symptoms and are the cause of her current condition based on her medical 
record.”65 
On January 3, 2006, Matison White, M.D., at Medical Park Family Care, 
evaluated Plaintiff. Dr. White opined that Plaintiff’s right knee showed “advanced 
signs of degenerative osteoarthritis and most likely is best treated by a total knee 
replacement.”
66 Dr. White also opined that “she should be retired from her work, 
as there is the great potential for further degenerative damage and, therefore, loss 
of quality of life and basic life functioning.”
67 Dr. White also noted, “Plaintiff is so 
very young, a total knee replacement needs to be avoided as long as possible in 
order for her to have a normal, useful knee during her expected normal life 
expectancy.”
68 
 
63 A.R. 469. 
64 A.R. Id. 
65 A.R. Id. 
66 A.R. 472. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 

 
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 On April 4, 2011, Plaintiff had x -rays of her knees. The x -rays showed 
“[s]evere right knee tricompartmental osteoarthr[it]is, likely posttraumatic” and “[n]o 
radiographic evidence for acute fracture, malalignment or dislocation.”69 
 On April 6, 2011, Dr. McGuire referred Plaintiff to Tim Kavanaugh, M.D., to 
“evaluate for TKR.”70 On April 14, 2011, Dr. McGuire wrote a letter on Plaintiff’s 
behalf. He noted that Plaintiff had been seen for an “ongoing period of time” for 
right knee pain and that over the years, Plaintiff’s right knee condition had 
worsened.
71 He stated that she had been diagnosed with severe tricompartmental 
degenerative joint disease of the right knee and had been referred to Dr. 
Kavanaugh for a right total knee replacement.
72 He noted that “[i]t has been 
recommended that she only performs sedentary work” and that her knee condition 
would continue to worsen and not improve over time.73 
 On July 18, 2017, Dr. White wrote a letter on Plaintiff’s behalf. Dr. White 
assessed Plaintiff with severe degenerative osteoarthritis of her right knee. 74 Dr. 
White noted that the knee had “further deteriorated” and that Plaintiff was “most 
likely going to require total knee replacement.” 75 Dr. White opined that Plaintiff 
 
69 A.R. 542. 
70 A.R. 419. 
71 A.R. 531. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 A.R. 14. 
75 Id. 

 
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was “not currently able to function normally or hold a job because of her chronic 
knee pain and disability.”76 
B. Medical Expert Hearing Testimony 
On November 18, 2020, medical expert Jack LeBeau, M.D., testified that 
Plaintiff had “very significant osteoarthropathy of the left knee” and agreed with the 
“unified opinion” of Plaintiff’s surgeons that she required knee replacement of the 
right knee.
77 He opined that a knee replacement lasts about 15 years and that 
Plaintiff may have been “a bit young” at the time of her injury for replacement. 78 
Dr. LeBeau opined that Plaintiff did not meet or medically equal the requirements 
for listing 1.02 in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P.
79 Dr. LeBeau noted 
that he did not see evidence that Plaintiff needed to use a cane regularly and she 
appeared to be “moving around.”80 
Dr. LeBeau testified that Plaintiff had the following limitations as of the date 
last insured: Plaintiff could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 
frequently; sit for an unlimited period of six to eight hours with regular breaks; stand 
for one hour at a time up to two hours in a workday; walk for 15 minutes at a time 
up to one hour in a workday; occasionally climb stairs and ramps, balance, kneel, 
 
76 Id. 
77 A.R. 693–94. 
78 A.R. 694. 
79 A.R. 696. 
80 Id. 

 
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crouch and crawl; needed to avoid unprotected heights; and could frequently 
tolerate machinery.81 He also opined that, even if Plaintiff had hip pain in 2011, 
the limitations would stay the same.82 
DISCUSSION 
Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges that the SSA decision should be 
reversed and remanded for the following reasons: (1) her date last insured is July 
31, 2025; (2) the ALJ failed to afford great weight to her treating physicians Dr. 
White’s and Dr. McGuire’s medical opinions; (3) if she is limited to only sedentary 
work, she would be found disabled under the Medical -Vocational Guidelines 
(“Grids”); and (4) the ALJ failed to include Plaintiff’s mental limitations in the RFC.83 
The Commissioner disagrees, and urges the Court to affirm the SSA decision. 84 
I. Date Last Insured 
 Plaintiff alleges that her date last insured is July 31, 2025. 85 The 
Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s determination of a date last insured of March 
31, 2011 is supported by agency records, including earnings records showing that 
Plaintiff has not reported earnings since 2007.86 
 
81 A.R. 696–99. 
82 A.R. 704. 
83 Docket 20 at 2–4. 
84 Docket 21 at 1–3. 
85 Docket 20 at 2. 
86 Docket 21 at 2, citing A.R. 105, 110, 114, 295, 894, 897. 

 
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 Under Title II of the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if the individual 
cannot work or engage in substantial gainful activity for a period of 12 continuous 
months because of a medically determinable impairment .87 Plaintiff bears the 
burden of establishing the existence of a severe impairment, and ultimately 
disability, prior to the last date insured. 88 And, “[i]n order to obtain disability 
benefits, [a claimant] must demonstrate that [s] he was disabled prior to [her] last 
insured date.”89 
The Commissioner calculates the date last insured using the claimant’s 
earned wages to determine the number of “quarters of coverage” a claimant has 
accumulated.90 To have disability insured status during any quarter, the claimant 
must be fully insured in that quarter and have at least 20 quarters of coverage in 
the last 40-quarter period ending with that quarter.91 
 Here, the ALJ’s date last insured determination is supported by Plaintiff’s 
earnings’ records.92 Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that she has engaged in 
substantial gainful activity since 2007 ; nor does she otherwise demonstrate that 
her date last insured should be changed to July 31, 2025.93 In sum, the ALJ’s date 
 
87 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1), (2). 
88 See Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir.1998); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 
F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.1995). 
89 Armstrong v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1998). 
90 20 C.F.R. § 404.130. 
91 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b). 
92 A.R. 885–92, 894–97, 899–903. 
93 Docket 20. 

 
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last insured determination is supported by substantial evidence. 
II. Medical Opinions 
Because Plaintiff filed her application before March 27, 2017, the relevant 
regulations in effect at the time will be applied to the Court’s analysis.94 Under the 
regulations prior to March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluates medical opinions based on 
the source of the opinion : physicians who treat the claimant; physicians who 
examine but do not treat the claimant; and physicians who neither examine nor 
treat the claimant.95 “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion 
of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.”96 
In the Ninth Circuit, when “a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted 
by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and 
legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.”
97 This can be done 
by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical 
evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.”98 
 
94 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). These sections apply to claims filed 
before March 27, 2017; but see Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of 
Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017), 2017 WL 168819, at 
*5867–68; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a) (for claims filed on or after 
March 27, 2017). 
95 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). 
96 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 
Cir. 1995)). 
97 Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). 
98 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Magallanes v. 
Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

 
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Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by failing to give great 
weight to the medical opinions of her treating doctors, Drs. White and McGuire. 99 
She does not appear to dispute the ALJ’s findings regarding the medical opinions 
of her other treating physicians, including Dr. Laufer.100 
The ALJ evaluated and discussed Dr. McGuire’s 2004 and 2011 opinion 
letters as well as Dr. White’s 2006 and 2017 opinion letters. 101 Because Dr. 
McGuire and Dr. White were treating physicians and their medical opinions were 
contradicted by other medical opinions in the record, the ALJ was required to 
provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for 
discounting these opinions. 
A. Dr. McGuire’s 2004 and Dr. White’s 2006 Opinions 
The ALJ discounted Dr. McGuire’s 2004 letter and Dr. White’s 2006 letter 
because they predated Plaintiff’s substantial gainful activity from June 2006 to 
January 2007.
102 In the Ninth Circuit, “[m]edical opinions that predate the alleged 
onset of disability are of limited relevance.” 103 Here, Plaintiff filed a previous 
application for benefits, which was denied after a hearing on June 5, 2006, and 
Plaintiff did not appeal the ALJ’s decision.104 Consequently, the medical opinions 
 
99 Docket 20 at 2–3. 
100 Docket 20. 
101 A.R. 670–71. 
102 A.R. 670–71. 
103 Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008). 
104 A.R. 739. 

 
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rendered in connection with Plaintiff’s previous application are of limited relevance. 
Moreover, participating in substantial gainful activity is a reason for rejecting 
a medical opinion that the claimant is disabled. 105 Here, Plaintiff worked as an 
office clerk after June 2006 t o January 2007, with job duties involving eight -hour 
workdays with standing, walking, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, as 
well as lifting up to 100 pounds or more. 106 Accordingly, Drs. McGuire’s and 
White’s medical opinions predating Plaintiff’s substantial gainful activity are of 
limited relevance for this reason as well. 
The ALJ also concluded that Dr. McGuire’s recommendation that Plaintiff 
retire was reasonable in the context of the heavy level job at the Army, but viewing 
Dr. McGuire’s statement “as one stating that [Plaintiff] could not work at all would 
be a highly and grossly inaccurate interpretation.”107 Consequently, the ALJ 
reasoned that Dr. McGuire’s 2004 letter did not contradict the RFC. 108 The ALJ 
also agreed with Dr. White’s support of Dr. McGuire’s recommendation to retire 
from her heavy level job with the Army and found that Dr. White’s 2006 opinion did 
not contradict the RFC.109 Taken in context, Dr. McGuire’s and Dr. White’s opinion 
 
105 Katz v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 972 F.2d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 423) (“A person is disabled only if [her] impairments make 
[her] unable to engage in ‘substantial gainful work.’”). 
106 A.R. 339, 669. 
107 A.R. 670. 
108 Id. 
109 A.R. 671. 

 
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that Plaintiff needed to retire from her 2004 heavy level job is reflected in the RFC. 
To the extent the opinions of Dr. McGuire and Dr. White from 2004 and 2006 
conflicted with the ALJ’s RFC and step five findings, the ALJ’s reasons for 
discounting these opinions are specific, legitimate, and supported by substantial 
evidence. 
B. Dr. McGuire’s April 2011 and Dr. White’s July 2017 Opinions 
The ALJ found that Dr. McGuire’s April 2011 opinion that Plaintiff could only 
perform sedentary work did not contradict the ALJ’s finding at step five , even if 
Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work. 110 Accordingly, the opinion supports the 
ALJ’s finding of no disability on or before March 31, 2011. This reason is supported 
by substantial evidence. 
The ALJ discounted Dr. White’s July 2017 opinion that Plaintiff was unable 
to function normally or hold a job due to knee pain. The ALJ reasoned that the 
2017 opinion referenced Plaintiff’s functioning at the time of the letter, not her 
functional capacity on or before March 2011.
111 Specifically, the ALJ noted that 
Dr. White opined that Plaintiff’s right knee impairment has worsened since 2014.112 
Because Dr. White’s July 2017 letter addressed Plaintiff’s limitations after her date 
last insured, its relevance to the disability period at issue is limited. Th e ALJ’s 
 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 A.R. 14, 671. 

 
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reason is specific, legitimate, and supported by substantial evidence. 
The ALJ also discounted Dr. McGuire’s and Dr. White’s medical opinions 
because they did not provide a functional assessment of Plaintiff’s limitations 
caused by her physical impairments.113 In the Ninth Circuit, an ALJ may discount 
a medical opinion that does “not show how [a claimant’s] symptoms translate into 
specific functional deficits which preclude work activity.”
114 However, whether an 
ALJ may reject a medical opinion because it lacks a function- by-function 
assessment is not a settled question in this circuit. District courts have recently 
held that a physician’s failure to provide a function -by-function analysis is not a 
valid reason for discounting that opinion.
115 And, in other district court cases, the 
Commissioner has declined to defend this position on appeal. 116 The 
Commissioner does not appear to address this reason his brief.117 
 
113 A.R. 669–70. 
114 Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that an ALJ 
may reject a medical opinion that includes “no specific assessment of [the 
claimant's] functional capacity” and does not include “any named limitations such 
as the inability to lift, stoop, walk, stand or sit”). 
115 Campuzano v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-721-WQH(WVG), 2021 WL 
3093571, at *10 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2021) (collecting cases). 
116 Elizabeth F. v. Comm'r SSA, No. 19CV202-YY, 2020 WL 5870205, at *6 (D. 
Or. Aug. 10, 2020) (“The Commissioner does not defend the validity of the ALJ's 
function-by-function rationale.”); Mary M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19CV327-
JR, 2020 WL 2556353, at *3 n.3 (D. Or. May 20, 2020) (“The Commissioner 
concedes that the lack of a function-by-function assessment is not a valid reason 
to discount the opinion.”). 
117 Docket 21. 

 
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To the extent the ALJ reject s Drs. McGuire’s and White’s medical opinions 
solely because they lack a function -by-function assessment, the Court finds that 
the ALJ erred. However, for the reasons set forth above, the ALJ provides other 
specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. 
McGuire’s and Dr. White’s opinions. Therefore, any error by the ALJ for improperly 
rejecting the medical opinions for failing to provide a functio n-by-function analysis 
is harmless.118 
In sum, the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions and medical expert 
testimony is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ provided specific and 
legitimate reasons for discounting the medical opinions of Dr. McGuire and Dr. 
White. 
III. Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) 
Plaintiff alleges that, based on Drs. McGuire’s and White’s opinions that she 
was limited sedentary or less-than-sedentary work, and considering her age of 61 
as of the date of her complaint, the Grids direct a finding of disabled.
119 The 
Commissioner contends that Plaintiff cannot be considered disabled under the 
Grids because she was considered a “younger individual” on the date last insured 
and she is not illiterate.120 
 
118 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (9th Cir. 2015). 
119 Docket 20 at 3. 
120 Docket 21 at 2–3. 

 
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The Grids are “a matrix system for handling claims that involve substantially 
uniform levels of impairment.”121 The Grids consist of three tables, each assessing 
disability in the context of “maximum sustained work capacity” limited to sedentary, 
light, or medium work. 122 They present a short -hand method for determining 
disability based on “various combinations of factors relevant to a claimant's ability 
to find work,” including a claimant's age, education, and work experience.
123 For 
each combination of these factors, the Grids direct a finding of either “disabled” or 
“not disabled” based on the number of jobs in the national economy in that category 
of physical-exertional requirements.
124 The Grids can be used at step five of the 
ALJ’s sequential evaluation when a claimant is able to perform the full range of 
jobs in a given category, i.e., sedentary work, light work, or medium work. 125 
Where a claimant has significant non-exertional limitations, such as poor vision or 
pain, reliance on the grids is only appropriate where the grids yield a finding of 
 
121 Tackett, 180 F.3d. at 1101, citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app 2. 
122 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, sec. 200.00. 
123 Id. 
124 Tackett, 180 F.3d. at 1101. 
125 Id. 

 
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“disabled.”126 “But if the same person is not disabled under the grids, the non -
exertional limitations must be examined separately.”127 
As discussed above, Plaintiff must establish Title II disability as of the date 
last insured. In this case, Plaintiff was 4 6 years old on the date last insured. 128 
Under the Grids, a claimant is considered a “younger individual” if she is aged 18–
49.129 In this age category, a finding of “disabled” is warranted for individuals 45–
49 who: (1) are restricted to sedentary work; (2) are unskilled or have no 
transferable skills; (3) have no past relevant work or can no longer perform past 
relevant work; and (4) are illiterate.
130 Even if Plaintiff is restricted to sedentary, 
unskilled work and can no longer perform her past relevant work, she is not illiterate 
and therefore, is not disabled under the Grids.
131 The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s 
non-exertional limitations in the RFC analysis. 132 Moreover, the ALJ called a 
 
126 See Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2006) (“’[W]here 
application of the grids directs a finding of disability, that finding must be accepted 
by the Secretary ... whether the impairment is exertional or results from a 
combination of exertional and non -exertional limitations.’ . . . Because the grids 
are not designed to establish automatically the existence of jobs for persons with 
both severe exertional and non -exertional impairments, they may not be used to 
direct a conclusion of nondisability.”) (emphasis original) (internal citations 
omitted). 
127 Id. 
128 Docket 20 at 3; A.R. 663. 
129 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, sec. 201.00(h)(1). 
130 Id. 
131 At the hearing on November 18, 2020 , Plaintiff testified that she had an 
associate’s degree in criminal justice. A.R. 705. Plaintiff also prepared her 
complaint and brief as a self-represented litigant. See Dockets 1, 20. 
132 A.R. 665–71. 

 
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vocational expert to testify whether jobs existed in the national economy for an 
individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC.133 
The ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Grids and the 
ALJ’s determination at step five is supported by substantial evidence. 
IV. Mental Impairments 
Plaintiff contends that she “has been unable to sustain employment due to 
her cognitive and other impairments [.]”134 The Commissioner counters that 
Plaintiff alleged only knee problems in her disability report and Plaintiff has not 
shown any support in the record for her contention.135 
Plaintiff does not appear to have alleged mental impairments during the 
administrative process with the SSA. A s pointed out by the Commissioner, in 
Plaintiff’s disability report from January 13, 2016, she reported that her knee joint 
deterioration and “arthritis in knees” limited her ability to work.136 She also reported 
that she had not received treatment for mental conditions. 137 Moreover, at the 
November 18, 2020 hearing, the ALJ clarified that Plaintiff had not alleged mental 
health conditions and Plaintiff’s attorney could not ask questions based on mental 
health limitations. 138 And, as noted by the Commissioner, Plaintiff has not 
 
133 A.R. 672, 726–32. 
134 Docket 20 at 4. 
135 Docket 21 at 3. 
136 A.R. 325. 
137 A.R. 328. 
138 A.R. 722 (“No medically determinable impairments have been alleged 

 
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supported her allegation with proof in the medical record.139 
In sum, the ALJ address ed all of Plaintiff’s medically determinable 
impairments in the decision and was not required to discuss mental limitations in 
this case. 
ORDER 
The Court, having carefully reviewed the administrative record, finds that the 
ALJ’s determinations are free from legal error and are supported by substantial 
evidence. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for relief at Docket 
20 is DENIED and the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED. All pending 
motions are denied as moot. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment 
in favor of Defendant and close this case. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 2026 at Anchorage, Alaska. 
/s/ Aaron Christian Peterson 
Aaron Christian Peterson 
United States District Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
concerning mental health conditions.”). 
139 See e.g., A.R. 469–598. 

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