govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_23-cv-04129-4

1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
RAYNE MEMORIAL UNITED 
METHODIST CHURCH, 
 Plaintiff 
 
CIVIL ACTION 
 
 
VERSUS NO. 23-4129 
 
CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, S.I., 
 Defendant 
SECTION: “E” (3) 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
 Before the Court is a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, 
for a new trial filed by Defendant, Ch urch Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. 
(“Defendant”).1 Plaintiff, Rayne Memorial United Me thodist Church (“Plaintiff”) filed a 
response.2 Defendant filed a reply.3 
BACKGROUND 
 This matter arises out of a Hurricane Ida insurance coverage dispute. Plaintiff 
alleged that Defendant issued an insurance po licy to cover Plaintiff’s property on St. 
Charles Avenue in New Orleans, Louisiana, and that on August 29, 2021, Hurricane Ida 
struck Southeast Louisiana, damaging severa l buildings in Plaintiff’s church complex. 4 
These allegations were not disputed at trial. 
 Plaintiff sued Defendant on August 24, 2023 for breach of contract, as well as for 
statutory penalties and attorneys’ fees pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973.5 
A four-day trial was held from February 2 to February 5, 2026. 6 At the conclusion of 
 
1 R. Doc. 181. 
2 R. Doc. 187. 
3 R. Doc. 188. 
4 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ ¶ 6-9. 
5 R. Doc. 1. 
6 R. Docs. 160, 162, 165, 166. 

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Plaintiff’s case, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed R. Civ. P. 
50(a), arguing it was entitled to a directed verdict because no reasonable juror would have 
a legally sufficient basis to fi nd that: (1) Plaintiff had spen t enough money to meet its 
deductible; (2) Defendant received satisfactory proof of loss and, if it did receive it, when; 
(3) Defendant engaged in “bad faith or vexatious behavior” or made any 
misrepresentations; (4) Hurricane Ida caused Plaintiff’s damages; 7 and (5) Plaintiff was 
entitled to consequential damages.8 The Court denied Defendant’s motion, finding there 
was legally sufficient evidence from which a reasonable person could find in favor of 
Plaintiff on these issues.9 
 At the end of trial, the jury found th at Defendant had breached its insurance 
contract with Plaintiff and violated La . R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973. 10 The jury 
found that Defendant arbitrarily, capriciously , and without probable cause had failed to 
make its payments in the amounts of $110,652.21 and $321,669.17 within thirty days of 
receiving satisfactory proof of loss, violating La. R.S. 22:1892.11 The jury found Defendant, 
arbitrarily, capriciously, and without probable cause, never paid Plaintiff an additional 
$2,818,230.66 for damages covered under the insurance policy after receiving 
satisfactory proof of loss, violating La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973. 12 The jury also 
found Plaintiff suffered $123,935 in consequential damages due to Defendant’s failure to 
pay Plaintiff the full amount it owed under the policy and Defendant’s misrepresentation 
of insurance policy provisions.13 
 
7 Defendant’s exact argument was that Plaintiff’s “o wn causation expert testified that he saw some 
preexisting water damage signs, but said he could no t confirm their cause[,]” which the Court interprets 
broadly as an argument regarding causation. R. Doc. 187-1 at p. 3. 
8 R. Doc. 187-1 at pp. 3-5. 
9 Id. at p. 11. 
10 R. Doc. 169. 
11 R. Doc. 169 at Question Nos. 1, 2. 
12 Id. at Question Nos. 4-7. 
13 Id. at Question Nos. 9-10, 14-15. 

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 Following the return of the jury’s verdict, the Court assessed the mandatory 
penalty against Defendant under La. R.S. 22:1892 of 50% of all damages Defendant owed 
Plaintiff under the contract that Defendant fa iled to pay within 30 days of receiving 
satisfactory proof of loss; this penalty amounted to $1,625,276.02. 14 Because significant 
penalties were awarded against the Defendant a s a r e s u l t o f t h e j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g s t h a t 
Defendant failed to timely pay amounts owed under the insurance policy, the Court 
exercised its discretion to reduce the penalties awarded as a result of Defendant’s 
misrepresentations in violation of La. R.S. 22:1973 to zero dollars ($0.00). 15 The Court 
entered a final judgment against Defendant in the amount $4,567, 441.68— this total 
includes the additional amount Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff ($2,818,230.66), 
consequential damages ($123,935), and penalties under La. R.S. 22:1892 
($1,625,276.02).16 
On March 27, 2026, Defendant filed the present Motion for Judgment as a Matter 
of Law or, in the Alternative, for a New Tr ial. Defendant raises several arguments it 
believes warrant granting its motion for judg ment as a matter of law. Defendant argues 
Plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings: that Hurricane 
Ida caused the damage to Plaintiff’s building complex; 17 that pre-existing defects and 
Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages di d not cause the interior water damage in 
Plaintiff’s buildings;18 that Defendant violated La. R.S. 22:1892, as Plaintiff failed to show 
that Defendant acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to pay Plaintiff the full amount 
of damages Plaintiff sought; 19 and that Defendant violated La. R.S. 22:1973, as Plaintiff 
 
14 R. Doc. 175. 
15 R. Doc. 174. 
16 Id. 
17 R. Doc. 181-1 at pp. 10-11. 
18 Id. at pp. 9, 10-14. 
19 Id. at pp. 15-17. 

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failed to show Defendant made intentional misrepresentations to Plaintiff.20 In addition, 
Defendant argues it actually ov erpaid Plaintiff for its claim. 21 Defendant argues that 
Plaintiff provided documentation it spent $ 778,140.85 for repairs after Hurricane Ida, 
which is $215,690.85 more than Plaintiff’s deductible of $562,450.00. 22 Defendant 
argues that it owed Plaintiff only the $215,690.85 difference between Plaintiff’s 
deductible and the amount Plaintiff sp ent on repairs, makings its $472,271.39 tender to 
Plaintiff an overpayment.23 
In the alternative, Defendant argues a new trial is warranted. Defendant argues the 
Court’s Jury Instruction No. 36 failed to include relevant language from La. R.S. 22:1892, 
which resulted in prejudice to the Defendant. 24 Defendant argues the inclusion of 
Questions 10 and 15 concerning consequential damages in the Jury Verdict Form also 
caused Defendant prejudice.25 Finally, Defendant argues it suffered prejudice due to the 
Court’s multiple evidentiary errors.26 
Plaintiff argues Defendant did not raise any argument in its Rule 50(a) motion 
concerning proof of causation or Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate and, as a result, Defendant 
has waived these arguments. 27 Plaintiff argues that, even if the Court were to consider 
these waived arguments, the Court st ill should deny Defendant’s motion. 28 Plaintiff 
argues it provided ample evidence demonstrating that Hurricane Ida caused its damages 
and that Defendant acted arbitrarily and capric iously in failing to pay Plaintiff the full 
 
20 Id. at p. 18. 
21 Id. at pp. 14-15 
22 Id. at p. 14. 
23 Id. at p. 15. 
24 Id. at p. 20. 
25 Id. at p. 21. 
26 Id. at pp. 23-25. 
27 R. Doc. 187 at pp. 3-4. 
28 Id. at pp. 4-7. 

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amount of damages owed. 29 In addition, Plaintiff argues Defendant bears the burden of 
proving that Plaintiff failed to mitigate it s damages and that the jury correctly found 
Plaintiff had failed to carry this burden. 30 Plaintiff further argues the insurance policy 
does not require that Plaintiff have already made repairs to its buildings to qualify for 
compensation and, as a result, Defendant’s liability is not limited to $215,690.85.31 
Plaintiff argues also that a new trial is unwarranted. 32 Plaintiff argues the Court 
did not err in instructing the jury or in in cluding questions on consequential damages in 
the Jury Verdict Form. 33 Finally, Plaintiff argues the Court did not commit any 
evidentiary errors.34 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
I. Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
The Court will deny Defendant’s Rule 50(b ) motion for judgment as a matter of 
law. Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter 
of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have 
submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later 
deciding the legal questions ra ised by the motion. No later 
than 28 days after the entry of judgment--or if the motion 
addresses a jury issue not decide d by a verdict, no later than 
28 days after the jury was disc harged--the movant may file a 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may 
include an alternative or join t request for a new trial under 
Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may: 
(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a 
verdict; 
(2) order a new trial; or 
(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.
35 
 
 
29 Id. at pp. 9-11, 13-16. 
30 Id. at pp. 11-12. 
31 Id. at pp. 12-13. 
32 Id. at p. 12. 
33 Id. at pp. 12-16. 
34 Id. at pp. 17-22. 
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 

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“A party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ‘only if the evidence points but one way 
and is susceptible to no reasonable infere nces which may support the opposing party's 
position.’”36 The Court does not “weigh evidence, ju dge witness credibility, or challenge 
the factual conclusions of the jury. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if there is 
no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a claim under the controlling law.” 37 “If a party 
fails to move for JMOL under Rule 50(a) afte r all the evidence has been presented, then 
‘that party waives both its right to file a renewed post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion and also 
its right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on that issue on appeal.’”38 The Fifth 
Circuit has held that, when a party does not raise an issue in a Rule 50(a) motion at trial, 
the party waives the ability to raise that issue in a post-trial Rule 50(b) motion.39 However, 
a party may raise an issue for the first time in a Rule 50(b) motion when it has made “a 
Rule 50(a) motion on a substantially similar issue adequate to give notice of the perceived 
insufficiency [of evidence].”40 
As Defendant raised its Rule 50(b) arguments, or substantially similar arguments, 
in its Rule 50(a) motion, these arguments have not been waived. 41 I n i t s R u l e 5 0 ( b ) 
motion, Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
finding that Defendant acted arbitrarily and capriciously; 42 that Plaintiff failed to offer 
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Defendant made intentional 
misrepresentations to Plaintiff; 43 that Plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to 
 
36 Logan v. Burgers Ozark Country Cured Hams Inc., 263 F.3d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 
37 Id. (citation and internal ellipsis omitted). 
38 Alonso v. Westcoast Corp., 920 F.3d 878, 884 (5th Cir. 2019) 
39 Id. 
40 Sonder USA, Inc. v. 635 N. Scott St., LLC, No. CV 18-13891, 2022 WL 1540593, at *10 (E.D. La. May 16, 
2022)(citing Foreman v. Acceptance Indem. Co., 730 F. App'x 191, 195 (5th Cir. 2018)). 
41 While Defendant did not expressly raise the issue of mitigation in its Rule 50(a) motion, the Court finds 
the issue of whether Plaintiff mitigated its damages is substantially similar to the issue of causation, which 
Defendant raised in its 50(a) motion. 
42 R. Doc. 181-1 at pp. 15-17. 
43 Id. at p. 18. 

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support the Jury’s finding that Hurricane Ida caused Plaintiff’s damages; 44 that Plaintiff 
failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Plaintiff did not fail to 
mitigate its damages;45 and that Defendant actually overpaid Plaintiff for its claim.46 
In this case, the Court finds no basis up on which to grant Defendant’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law. A court should grant a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law only if there “is no legally sufficient evid entiary basis for a reasonable jury to have 
found for that party with respect to that issue.” 47 Because the “standard of review with 
respect to a Jury verdict is especially defe rential,” a Rule 50 motion “should not be 
granted unless the facts and inferences poin t so strongly and overwhelmingly in the 
movant’s favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.”48 The Court 
finds the evidence and testimony at trial was sufficient to support the Jury’s verdict. The 
Jury performed its task of weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of 
witnesses—its findings will not be disturbed by the Court. Accordingly, the Court will deny 
Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on these issues. 
II. Defendant is not entitled to a new trial. 
In the alternative, Defendant requ ests this Court grant a new trial. 49 Rule 
59(a)(1)(A) provides that a new trial may be granted “for any reason for which a new trial 
has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” The Fifth Circuit has 
 
44 Id. In Defendant’s 50(a) motion, Defendant argued Plaintiff’s “own causation expert testified that he saw 
some pre-existing water damage signs, but said he could not confirm the cause.” R. Doc. 187-1 at p.4. While 
Defendant appears to argue Plainti ff’s expert could not confirm whether Hurricane Ida caused Plaintiff’s 
damage, Plaintiff’s expert actually testified that he could not confirm that signs of prior water damage, such 
as brown stains on ceiling roof tiles, were caused by active leaks at the time of Hurricane Ida. 
45 R. Doc. 181-1 at pp. 13-14. 
46 Id. at pp. 14-15. Defendant argues that it owed Plaintiff only the $215,690.85 difference between Plaintiff’s 
deductible and the amount Plaintiff spent on repairs, makings its $472,271.39 tender to Plaintiff an 
overpayment. R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 15. Defendant raised the same issue in its Rule 50(a) motion, arguing that 
it did not owe Plaintiff any damages under the policy because Plaintiff had not offered evidence showing it 
met its deductible. R. Doc. 187-1 at p. 4. 
47 Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2001). 
48 Id. Defendant did not have an official transcript prepared for its motion. 
49 R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 20. 

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held that Rule 59(a) allows the district court to grant a new trial if, for example, it ‘finds 
the verdict is against the weight of the ev idence, the damages awarded are excessive, the 
trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.’” 50 Importantly, “[a] 
motion for a new trial or to amend a judgment ‘cannot be used to raise arguments which 
could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.’” 51 “Courts look 
skeptically at . . . claims for a do-over, es pecially in the context of a jury verdict.” 52 
Moreover, “[a] motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 is an extraordinary remedy that 
should be used sparingly.”53 
A. Defendant did not object to the omission of language regarding 
partial payment in Jury Instru ction No. 36. Even if it had 
objected, the instruction was correct and non-prejudicial. 
 
The Court will not grant Defendant’s moti on for a new trial based on the Jury 
Instructions. Defendant argues the Court’s Ju ry Instruction No. 36 failed to include 
relevant language from La. R.S. 22:1892.54 Jury Instruction No. 36 read as follows: 
The second governing statute is La. R.S. 22:1892. If you find that the insurer failed 
to pay any “undisputed amount” within 30 days of receipt of “satisfactory proof of 
loss,” and you find that refusal was “arb itrary, capricious, or without probable 
cause,” the insurer is liable for its breach of this statute. 
 
If you find the insurer is liable as a result of the insurer’s failure to pay within the 
statutory time limit, in addition to the contractual amount owed by the insurer to 
the insured, the penalty is fifty percent (50%) of the amount you determined the 
insured contractually owed the insured or one thousand dollars, whichever is 
greater.
55 
 
 
50 Smith v. Transworld Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). 
51 Garriott v. NCsoft Corp., 661 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2011). 
52 Id. 
53 Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 783, 784 (E.D. La. 2000). 
54 R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 20. Plaintiff’s bad faith claims arise under the versions of La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 
22:1973 that were effective on August 29, 2021, the date Plaintiff suffered its damages. 
55 R. Doc. 168 at p. 17. Jury Instruction No. 36 incorrectly states that the minimum penalty for violation of 
La. R.S. 22:1892 is $1,000. However, the actual minimum penalty is $2,500, as Plaintiff’s property damage 
was caused by a declared disaster. The Court notes that the parties never raised the issue of the amount of 
the minimum penalty during proceedings. In fact, both parties’ proposed instructions included $1,000 as 
the minimum penalty for violation of La. R.S. 22:1892. R. Doc. 187-3 at p. 10; 132 at p. 23. In any event, the 
difference between the minimum penalty is of no import, as Plaintiff sought and received damages well in 
excess of the minimum penalty. 

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Defendant argues that, because it made part ial payments to Plaintiff for Hurricane Ida-
related damage, the Court should have includ ed language from the statute reflecting 
penalties in the event of a partial payment shown in bold below:56 
In the case of a presidentially or gubernatorially declared disaster, failure to make 
such payment within thirty days after re ceipt of such satisfactory written proofs 
and demand therefor or failure to make a written offer to settle any property 
damage claim, including a third-party clai m, within thirty days after receipt of 
satisfactory proofs of loss of that claim, as provided in Paragraphs (A)(1) and (4) 
of this Section, respectively, or failure to make such payment within thirty days 
after written agreement or settlement as provided in Paragraph (A)(2) of this 
Section when such failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable 
cause, shall subject the insurer to a penalty, in addition to the amount of the loss, 
of fifty percent damages on the amount fo und to be due from the insurer to the 
insured, or two thousand five hundred dollars, whichever is greater, payable to the 
insured, or in the event a partial payment or tender has been made, fifty 
percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the 
amount found to be due as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs 
or two thousand five hundred dollars, whichever is greater.
57 
 
Defendant argues Jury Instruction No. 36 sh ould have included the language in bold 
alone and should have instructed the jury to consider the payments Defendant had 
already made to Plaintiff when calculating damages. 58 Defendant argues the omission of 
this language was significant and prejudicial.59 Defendant argues it timely objected to the 
omission of this language in Instruction No. 36 but fails to provide a citation to the record 
establishing that it made this objection.60 
 Plaintiff argues that, not only did Defendant not object at trial to Jury Instruction 
No. 36, Defendant proposed the exact language that appeared in Jury Instruction No. 36 
before the trial and never proposed that any language concerning partial tenders be 
added.61 Plaintiff further argues Jury Instructio n No. 36 contained the correct language 
 
56 R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 20. 
57 La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1)(b). 
58 R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 21. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 R. Doc. 187 at p. 18. 

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from the statute and, as a result, did not prejudice Defendant. 62 Plaintiff points out that 
the Jury Verdict Form separated the amount s Defendant untimely paid versus amounts 
Defendant had never paid. 63 Plaintiff argues it did not receive duplicate penalties under 
La. R.S. 22:1892 and, as a result, the omis sion of language concerning partial payment 
caused Defendant no harm.64 
The Court will not grant a new trial based on Jury Instruction No. 36, as Defendant 
failed to preserve any objection to the omission of language concerning partial tenders in 
Instruction No. 36.“[A] motion for a new trial or to amend a judgment ‘cannot be used to 
raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.’”65 
In the parties’ initial joint proposed jury instructions filed on January 23, 2026, the 
parties proposed an instruction stating: 
Elements of Statutory Bad Faith (La. R.S. § 22:1892): Failure to Pay 
Timely 
 
An insurer issuing the type of policy at issue here must pay a claim within thirty 
days after it receives “satisfactory proof of loss.” 
 
The first Louisiana “bad faith” statute prov ides that if the insurer fails to pay the 
claim within that period and its failure is arbitrary, capricious or without probable 
cause, it is subjected to a penalty (in addition to the amount of the loss itself) of 
50% of the amount found to be due from the insurer to the insured or $1,000, 
whichever is greater, plus reasonable atto rney’s fees and costs to be set by the 
Court. 
 
You must determine whether Church Mutual received satisfactory proof of loss, 
whether Church Mutual failed to pay within the thirty-day period after receipt of 
satisfactory proof of loss, and whether the insurer’s failure was arbitrary, 
capricious or without probable cause.
 66 
 
 
62 Id. at p. 19. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Garriott v. NCsoft Corp., 661 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2011). 
66 R. Doc. 136 at p. 25. 

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Defendant provided an additional version of proposed jury instructions on January 28, 
2026; in the second version, Defendant proposed different language for some instructions 
but proposed the exact same language included in Instruction No. 36 for the instruction 
on bad faith penalties under La. R.S. § 22:1892.67 Throughout the process of revising the 
jury instructions, Defendant never objected to the omission of language concerning 
partial tenders, even when the parties made objections to the Court’s proposed jury 
instructions on the record on January 30, 2026. 68 Furthermore, before immediately 
instructing the jury on the law, the Court a llowed both parties to note on the record any 
objections they had to the Co urt’s final jury instructions. 69 Defendant objected to 
Instruction No. 36, but only on grounds th at the instruction did not specify that 
satisfactory proof of loss must come in written form.70 Defendant also requested the Court 
“remove the last sentence” of Jury Instruct ion No. 26, which stated that an insurance 
company bears the burden of demonstrating th at particular damage is excluded from 
coverage.71 These were the only two objections Defendant raised on the record, and 
neither related to the inclusion of partial payment language. Because Defendant failed to 
raise any objection to the omission of lang uage concerning partial tenders before the 
Court instructed the jury, the Court will not grant Defendant a new trial based on Jury 
Instruction No. 36.72 
 
67 R . D o c . 1 8 7 - 3 a t p . 1 0 ( D e f e n d a n t ’ s J a n u a r y 2 8 , 2 0 2 6 e m a i l t o t h e C o u r t c o n t a i n i n g p r o p o s e d j u r y 
instructions). 
68 See R. Doc. 155 (Defendant articulating no objection to proposed jury instruction no. 17: “The penalty is 
fifty percent (50%) of the amount you determined the insurer contractuall y owed the insured.”); see also 
Rec. Docs. 163-164 (briefing by Pl aintiff and Defendant ad dressing Defendant’s objection to the Court’s 
proposed jury instructions). 
69 Jury Charge Objections Transcript, p. 3. 
70 Id. at pp. 10-11. 
71 Id. at p. 6. 
72 See Garriott, 661 F.3d at 248. 

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In addition, the Court will not grant a new trial based on the language in 
Instruction No. 36 as the instruction was correct and its inclusion did not prejudice 
Defendant. Even though Defendant did not object to the omission of language concerning 
partial tenders, “a trial court has a duty to instruct the jurors, fully and correctly, on the 
applicable law of the case.”73 The Fifth Circuit has stated that it will grant a new trial based 
on a jury instruction only when “the charge as a whole leaves us with substantial and 
ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations.” 74 
Moreover, courts may grant a new trial if the court finds “the trial was unfair, or 
prejudicial error was committed in its course.”75 
While Defendant suggests that the lack of language concerning partial payment 
resulted in “stacking penalties,”76 this did not occur. The Fifth Circuit has made clear that 
the partial payment language in La. R.S. 22:18 92 “applies if (and only if) the insured’s 
partial payment complies with the statutory requirements—namely, it is tendered “within 
thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured.” 77 As a result, 
because Defendant’s payments were not made within 30 days, the language concerning 
partial payment was not applicable in this case and would have had no impact on the 
Jury’s verdict. The Jury Verdict Form correctly separated the amounts Defendant had 
already paid, albeit not timely, from the amounts Defendant never paid.78 Question No. 1 
in the verdict form asked the jury 
Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence th at any of the payments that 
Church Mutual Insurance Company (“Church Mutual”) made to Rayne Memorial 
 
73 Horton v. Buhrke, a Div. of Klein Tools, Inc., 926 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1991). 
74 Id. 
75 Smith v. Transworld Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985)(emphasis added). 
76 R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 20. 
77 French v. Allstate Indem. Co., 637 F.3d 571, 588 (5th Cir. 2011)(interpreting La. R.S. 22:658, which was 
later renumbered as La. R.S. 22:1892.) 
78 R. Doc. 169. 

13 
United Methodist Church (“Rayne”) in 2021 and 2022 were made more than 30 
days after Church Mutual received satisfactory proofs of loss for such amounts?79 
 
Separately, question No. 4 in the verdict form asked the jury 
What additional amount do you find by a preponderance of the evidence Church 
Mutual owes Rayne for property damage resulting from Hurricane Ida?80 
 
The jury determined that, although Defendant tendered two payments of $110,652.21 and 
$321,669.17 to Plaintiff for Hurricane Ida- related damage, it failed to make these 
payments within 30 days afte r satisfactory proof of loss. 81 In addition, the jury found 
Defendant never paid Plaintiff $2,818,230.66 it owed under the policy, even after 
receiving satisfactory proof of loss. 82 Accordingly, the Jury found Defendant did not pay 
any amount of money it owed Plaintiff within 30 days of receiving satisfactory proof of 
loss. La. R.S. 22:1892 requires the Co urt to assess a mandatory penalty on all amounts 
the insurer failed to pay within 30 days, regardless of whether the insured eventually 
makes the payment, 83 which this Court did. 84 To allow otherwise would “read out the 
statute’s time-limit requirement” and “permit insurers who had untimely paid 100 
percent of a[n] insured’s claim to avoid statutory penalties.” 85 T h e l a n g u a g e o f J u r y 
Instruction No. 36 properly guided the jury in their deliberations and did not prejudice 
Defendant, and the Court will not grant Defendant a new trial on these grounds. 
 
 
 
 
79 Id. at Question No. 1. 
80 Id. at Question No. 4. 
81 R. Doc. 169, Question No. 2. 
82 Id. at Question Nos. 4-5. 
83 French, 637 F.3d at 588. 
84 R. Doc. 175. 
85 French, 637 F.3d at 588. 

14 
B. Defendant did not object to th e inclusion of questions on 
consequential damages in the Jury Verdict Form. Even if it had 
objected, the Court did not err in including these questions. 
 
Defendant argues this Court should gran t a new trial because the Court included 
questions concerning consequential damages in the Jury Verdict Form.
86 Question No. 10 
on the Jury Verdict Form asked the jury: 
What amount of damages did Rayne sustain, beyond what it was owed under the 
insurance policy, as a result of Church Mutual’s failure to pay Rayne the amount 
you identified in Question No. 4. [additional amount owed] within 60 days?87 
 
Question No. 15 on the Jury Verdict form asked the jury: 
 
What amount of damages did Rayne sustain, beyond what it was owed under the 
insurance policy, as a result of Church Mutual’s breach of its duty of good faith and 
fair dealing by misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions?
88 
 
Defendant argues the Court should not have included these questions in the Jury Verdict 
Form because the contract between the partie s did not allow recovery for consequential 
damages.89 Defendant argues the insurance policy states that Defendant will pay the 
replacement cost or actual cash value of the property “as of the time of loss or damage[.]”90 
Defendant argues the policy further provides that Defendant “will not pay on a 
Replacement Cost basis for any loss or damage: (a) Until the lost or damaged property is 
actually repaired or replaced; and (b) Unless the repairs or replacement are made as soon 
as reasonably possible after the loss or damage.” 91 Defendant argues this language 
prohibits Plaintiff from recovering any conse quential damages under the contract, such 
as damages for the increase in the pr ice of materials from 2021 to 2026. 92 Defendant 
 
86 R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 21. 
87 R. Doc. 169, Question No. 10. 
88 Id., Question No. 15. 
89 R. Doc 181-1 at p. 21. 
90 Id. at p. 22. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 

15 
argues including a question on an item of damages that the insurance policy does not 
provide taints the verdict and warrants granting a new trial.93 
Plaintiff argues Defendant never objected to any jury instruction, any portion of 
the jury verdict form, or the proposed judg ment on the basis that they referenced 
consequential damages and, as a result, Defendant has failed to preserve this objection.94 
Plaintiff argues that, even if Defendant ha d objected to questions on consequential 
damages, La. R.S. 22:1973 expressly allows an insured to recover all damages that result 
from an insurer’s bad faith. 95 Plaintiff argues Defendant’s failure to timely pay Plaintiff 
the full amount owed under the policy resulted in consequential damages due to the price 
increases for labor and materials since 2021. 96 Plaintiff argues the jury properly found 
that Defendant’s failure to timely pay the full amount owed under the policy caused 
Plaintiff $123,935 in consequential damages.97 
The Court will not grant a new trial based on the inclusion of questions in the Jury 
Verdict Form concerning consequential damage s as Defendant did not preserve this 
objection. “[A] motion for a new trial or to amend a judgment ‘cannot be used to raise 
arguments which could, and should, have b een made before the judgment issued.’” 98 
Throughout the process of creating the Jury Verdict Form, Defendant did not argue the 
Court should exclude any questions referenc ing consequential damages. It is true 
Defendant provided a proposed jury verdict form to the Court on January 16, 2026, which 
did not include a question asking what am ount of consequential damages Defendant 
owed Plaintiff.99 On January 26, 2026, the Court emailed the parties a proposed verdict 
 
93 Id. at p. 23. 
94 R. Doc. 187 at p. 20. 
95 Id. at p. 21. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Garriott v. NCsoft Corp., 661 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2011). 
99 R. Doc. 122-5. 

16 
form which did include questions on consequential damages under La. R.S. 22:1973. Even 
if the Court considered Defendant’s omission of any question refe rencing consequential 
damages in its January 16, 2026 version of th e jury verdict form as an objection to the 
inclusion of such questions, at the January 28, 2026 status conference the Court invited 
the parties to submit a new proposed jury verdict form. 100 Both Plaintiff and Defendant 
submitted new versions of the jury verdict form; 101 Defendant was free to propose 
whatever form it saw fit. Defendant’s verd ict form included the same questions on 
consequential damages under La. R.S. 22:1973 that the Court included in its proposed 
form, and Defendant did not note any objection to these questions.102 
Furthermore, before providing the final verdict form to the Jury, the Court allowed 
both parties to note on the record any objections they had to the verdict form—Defendant 
made no objections to the jury verdict form at that time. 103 Because Defendant failed to 
expressly raise the issue of consequential da mages before the Court provided the verdict 
form to the jury, the Court will not grant Defe ndant a new trial based on the inclusion of 
questions in the Jury Verdict Form concerning consequential damages.104 
In addition, the Court will not grant a new trial because the Court did not err in 
including questions on consequential damage s in the Jury Verdic t Form. La. R.S. 
22:1973(A) provides that: 
Any insurer who breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing “shall be liable for 
any damages sustained as a result of the breach.105 
 
La. R.S. 22:1973(B) states that an insurer can breach its duty of good faith by 
 
100 R. Doc. 142. 
101 R. Doc. 149 (Plaintiff’s Proposed Verdict Form); R. Doc. 156 (Defendant’s Proposed Verdict Form). 
102 See R. Doc. 156, Question Nos. 10, 15. 
103 Jury Charge Objections Transcript, p. 3. 
104 Garriott, 661 F.3d at 248. 
105 La. R.S. 22:1973(A)(emphasis added). 

17 
(1) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insu rance policy provisions related to 
coverage;106 
 
or by 
(5) Failing to pay the amount of any claim due any person insured by the contract 
within sixty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the claimant when 
such failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.107 
 
Reading these provisions together, La. R.S. 22: 1973 allows for an insured to receive (1) 
consequential damages that result from an insurer’s arbitrary and capricious failure to 
pay a claim within sixty days of receipt of satisfactory proof of loss and/or (2) 
consequential damages that result from an insurer’s misrepresentation of facts or 
provisions related to coverage. Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized 
that La. R.S. 22:1973 allows for recovery of consequential damages. 108 Question Nos. 10 
and 15 are consistent with these provisions of La. R.S. 22:1973. Question No. 10 asked the 
jury what damages outside of the contract Pl aintiff suffered as a result of Defendant’s 
failure to pay the amount it owed under the policy within 60 days. Question No. 15 asked 
the jury what damages outside of the contract Plaintiff suffered as a result of Defendant’s 
misrepresentations. Both questions are proper under La. R.S. 22:1973 which allows an 
insured to recover any damages that result from an insurer’s breach of its duty of good 
faith.109 The fact that Defendant disagrees with the jury’s answer to these questions does 
not render the questions inappropriate.110 Accordingly, the Court did not err in including 
 
106 La. R.S. 22:1973(B)(1), (5). 
107 La. R.S. 22:1973(B)(5). 
108 See Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 2011-0084 (La. 10/25/11), 74 So. 3d 1159, 1169 (recognizing that La. 
R.S. 22:1220, which was later renumbered as La. R. S. 22:1973, allowed for recovery of consequential 
damages). 
109 La. R.S. 22:1973(A). 
110 Defendant cites First Baptist Church of Iowa, La. v. Church Mut. Ins. Co ., S.I., seemingly for the 
proposition that this Court should review the jury’s award of consequential damages as a question of law 
and afford it no deference. R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 23 (citing 105 F.4th 775, 786–88 (5th Cir. 2024). However, 
the Fifth Circuit in that case overturned a judgment in a bench trial, not a jury trial. Moreover, in First 
Baptist, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the trial court’s interpretation of an insurance policy de novo; it did not, 
review a jury’s award of consequential damages de novo. 

18 
questions on consequential damages under La. R.S. 22:1973 in the Jury Verdict Form and 
the Court will not grant a new trial on this ground. 
C. The Court did not err in allowing Marcel Fournet to testify as an 
expert. 
 
Defendant argues this Court should grant a new trial because the Court improperly 
allowed Plaintiff’s expert Marcel Fournet to testify without providing an expert report that 
complied with the requirements of Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Rule 26 requires that 
witnesses retained to provide expert testimony must provide a report containing, among 
other requirements, a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the 
basis and reasons for them.111 To determine admissibility of expert testimony, a trial court 
should “approach its task ‘with proper deference to the jury’s role as the arbiter of disputes 
between conflicting opinions. As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and 
sources of an expert’s opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its 
admissibility and should be left for the jury’s consideration.’” 112 “The ‘basic purpose’ of 
Rule 26 is ‘preventing prejudice and surprise.’”113 Importantly, the Fifth Circuit reviews a 
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion.114 
Defendant argues that, even though Fourn et testified that Hurricane Ida caused 
Plaintiff’s damages, Fournet’s expert report did not contain a written scope of work or a 
written causation analysis.115 Defendant argues the Court acknowledged this deficiency in 
Fournet’s expert report yet allowed Fournet to testify as to causation.116 
 
111 Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 26(a)(2)(B). 
112 United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less Situated in Leflore Cnty., State of Miss. , 80 F.3d 
1074, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
113 Seilham v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 360 F. Supp. 3d 412, 421 (E.D. La. 2018) (quoting Reed 
v. Iowa Marine & Repair Corp., 16 F.3d 82, 85 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
114 First United Pentecostal Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 119 F.4th 417, 424 (5th Cir. 2024). 
115 R. Doc. 181-1 at p 23. 
116 Id. at p. 24. 

19 
Plaintiff argues Fournet issued two expert reports that sufficiently described the 
opinions he expressed at trial. 117 Plaintiff argues Fournet’s reports explained that it was 
his opinion that Hurricane Ida’s winds and ra in caused damage to Plaintiff’s building 
complex and that Louis Relle’s estimate to re pair Plaintiff’s Ida-related damage was “an 
appropriate scope of repair for damages caus ed by high winds during Hurricane Ida to 
the varying conditions throughout the [Plaintiff’s] facility.”118 
The Court properly allowed Fournet to testify. During trial, Defendant objected to 
Fournet testifying and presented these same arguments on whether Fournet’s expert 
report contained his opinion that Hurricane Ida caused Plaintiff’s damages. The Court 
ruled that, because Fournet stated in his re port that Louis Relle’s estimate was “an 
appropriate scope of repair for damages caus ed by high winds during Hurricane Ida,” 
Fournet had stated his opinion that Hurricane Ida had caused the damages Plaintiff 
claimed.119 Fournet also stated in his report that storm winds blew off, damaged, and lifted 
multiple roofing tiles, which “present[ed] openings for storm water and subsequent rain 
water to enter.” 120 Moreover, Defendant deposed Fournet before trial. At Fournet’s 
deposition, Fournet stated that the Relle esti mate “assign[ed] no work other than what 
we perceive to be Ida damage.” 121 This statement put Defendant on notice that Fournet, 
relying on Relle’s estimate, would testify as to the scope of damage that Hurricane Ida 
caused. As a result, Defendant suffered no pr ejudice or surprise from Fournet’s trial 
testimony.122 Defendant has not presented any argume nt that sways this Court from its 
initial finding that Fournet should be allowed to testify to causation. The decision to admit 
 
117 R. Doc. 187 at p. 22. 
118 R. Doc. 77-12 at p. 3. Plaintiff attached Fournet’s expert reports to its response to Defendant’s Motion in 
Limine to exclude his testimony. R. Docs. 77-11, 77-12. 
119 Id. 
120 R. Doc. 77-11 at pp. 1-2. 
121 R. Doc. 187-4 at 72:19-22. 
122 See Seilham, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 421. 

20 
Fournet’s testimony was within the Court’s discretion, and the Court did not err in 
allowing Fournet to provide expert testimony. 123 Accordingly, the Court will not grant a 
new trial on this ground. 
D. The Court did not err in allowing Plaintiff to introduce videos of 
Hurricane Ida into evidence. 
 
Defendant argues this Court erred in allo wing Plaintiff to introduce Exhibits 235-
238, which are videos showing the Rayne complex and grounds during Hurricane Ida.124 
Defendant argues Plaintiff did not call the Ch urch sexton, who recorded the videos, as a 
witness to authenticate this evidence. 125 Defendant argues Pastor Jay Hogewood’s 
testimony was not sufficient to authenticate th e videos because he could not testify as to 
what exact time the Sexton took the videos. 126 Plaintiff argues that, because Pastor 
Hogewood testified that he received the vide os from the sexton via text message during 
Hurricane Ida and was able to verify what th ey depicted, the Court correctly found that 
Pastor Hogewood’s testimony authenticated the video exhibits.127 
Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) provides that evidence may be authenticated through 
testimony from a witness with knowledge “that an item is what it is claimed to be.” 128 
Video evidence may be authenticated through “foundation evidence sufficient to show the 
circumstances under which the film was activa ted and made, the chain of custody of the 
film, and the reliability of the process.”129 Pastor Hogewood testified that he received the 
video exhibits during Hurricane Ida from the Church sexton. In addition, Pastor 
Hogewood, who is intimately familiar with the Rayne complex, described and identified 
 
123 See First United Pentecostal Church., 119 F.4th at 424. 
124 R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 24. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 R. Doc. 187 at p. 27. 
128 Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). 
129 USA v. Sterling, 550 F.Supp.3d 358, 361 (M.D. La. July 23, 2021)(quoting United States v. Clayton, 643 
F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981). 

21 
the areas of the Rayne complex each video depicted. Pastor Hogewood knew that he 
received the videos sometime during Hurricane Ida—the fact that Pastor Hogewood could 
not testify to the exact hour and minute he received these videos does not render him 
unable to authenticate them. Accordingly, the Court did not err in allowing Plaintiff to 
introduce videos of the Rayne complex recorded during Hurricane Ida. 
Even if the Court erred in allowing Plaintiff to introduce videos showing Plaintiff’s 
property during Hurricane Ida, such error does not warrant granting a new trial. The Fifth 
Circuit has held that a court may grant a new trial if 
“the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.’” 130 “Courts do not 
grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record 
or that substantial justice has not been do ne, and the burden of showing harmful error 
rests on the party seeking the new trial.”131 
Defendant has failed to carry its burden of proving the admission of these videos 
constituted harmful error or that Defendant suffered prejudice. The videos depicted 
Plaintiff’s complex during the hurricane; the videos did not include commentary or 
opinion on whether the storm actually caused Plaintiff’s property damage. As a result, the 
Court will not grant a new trial based on this argument. 
E. The Court did not err in exclud ing Defendant’s unauthenticated 
videos. 
 
Defendant argues this Court erred in not allowing Defendant to introduce Exhibit 
212, which consists of two videos depicting the gravel roof of the Westerfield building in 
the Rayne complex.132 Defendant argues these videos, taken by an unidentified employee 
 
130 Smith v. Transworld Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). 
131 United States v. Healthcare Assocs. of Texas, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-02486-N, 2025 WL 1885642, at *1 (N.D. 
Tex. July 8, 2025)(citing Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 1999). 
132 R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 24. 

22 
from Above All Construction, would have im peached Plaintiff’s witnesses who testified 
there were no active roof leaks prior to Hurricane Ida.133 
Plaintiff argues Defendant provided no witness who could authenticate the videos 
of the gravel roof.134 Plaintiff argues that, not only was the person who took the videos not 
at trial, but no trial witness had ever seen these videos and Defendant could not offer any 
testimony concerning when the videos were ta ken, where they were taken, by whom, or 
what they showed. 135 As a result, Plaintiff argues th is Court correctly excluded these 
videos.136 
The Court did not err in excluding thes e videos. Defendant did not offer any 
testimony showing “the circumstances under which the film was activated and made, the 
chain and custody of the film, an d the reliability of the process.” 137 The Above All 
Construction employee who took the videos did not testify at trial; in fact, no witness 
testified as to what the videos depicted. Accordingly, Defendant failed to offer foundation 
evidence that authenticated these videos, and the Court will not grant a new trial on this 
ground. 
Even if the Court erred in preventing Defendant from introducing these videos into 
evidence, the Court would still not grant a new trial. Again, Defendant has failed to carry 
its burden of proving the exclusion of thes e videos constituted harmful error or that 
Defendant suffered prejudice. Defendant had the ability to cross-examine Plaintiffs’ 
witnesses on whether Plaintiff’s buildings had active roof leaks prior to Hurricane Ida. In 
addition, Defendant had ample opportunity to introduce authenticated evidence in an 
 
133 Id. 
134 R. Doc. 187 at p. 27. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 USA v. Sterling, F.Supp.3d 358, 365-61 (E.D. La. July 7, 2023)(quoting United States v. Clayton , 643 
F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981). 

23 
attempt to show the buildings had active roof leaks at the time of the hurricane. As a 
result, even if the Court should have allowe d Defendant to introduce these videos into 
evidence, the Court would not grant a new trial based on this argument. 
CONCLUSION 
 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, 
Alternatively, Motion for New Trial is DENIED.138 
 New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of May, 2026. 
 
______ __________ ____________ 
SUSIE MORGAN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
138 R. Doc. 181. 

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