govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_26-cv-00077-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
BANK OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) 1:26cv77 
 ) 
JARREL MAPP, ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge. 
Before the court is the motion to remand by Plaintiff Bank of 
America (the “Bank”). (Doc. 10.) Defendant Jarrel Mapp has filed 
a response in opposition (Doc. 12), to which Plaintiff has replied 
(Doc. 13). Mapp has also filed a surreply, although without court 
permission. (Doc. 14.) The motion is fully briefed and ready for 
resolution. 
For the following reasons, the motion will be granted, the 
case will be remanded, and the court will require Mapp to show 
cause within 14 days why his frivolous removal and briefing has 
not violated Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and why he should not be sanctioned accordingly. Further, because 
a party may receive “just costs and any actual expenses, including 
attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c), the court shall grant the Bank 14 days, if it so elects, 
within which to file an appropriate motion for costs and expenses, 

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supported by affidavit and timekeeping records. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Bank commenced this action against Mapp on July 24, 2025, 
in the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, of 
Guilford County, North Carolina. (Doc. 4.) The complaint seeks 
collection of $4,732.70 allegedly owed by Mapp on a credit account, 
along with post-judgment interest and costs. (See id.) Mapp filed 
a petition for removal on January 21, 2026, “due to State Court 
lacking subject -matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Mapp’s 
Counterclaim and Answer.”1 (Doc. 2.) 
On February 10, 2026, Mapp filed an answer to the complaint 
and asserted a counterclaim against the Bank, charging violations 
of federal banking laws, among other things. 
On April 7, 2026, the Bank moved to remand the case, contending 
that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 
(Docs. 10, 11.) Mapp filed a response (Doc. 12), and the Bank filed 
a reply (Doc. 13). Mapp thereafter filed a surreply. (Doc. 14.) 
The motion is ready for decision. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 Mapp appears pro se. Thus, the court does not scrutinize his 
filings “with such technical nicety that a meritorious claim should 
 
1 Mapp erroneously contends that his counterclaim (not filed until after 
removal) seeking $143,000, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the North 
Carolina District Court, is a basis for lack of state court subject 
matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 12 at 13.) 

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be defeated.” Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). 
But the liberal construction of a pro se litigant's filing does not 
require the court to ignore clear defects in it. Bustos v. 
Chamberlain, No. 09-1760, 2009 WL 2782238, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 
2009). Or to become an advocate for the pro se party. Weller v. 
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); see also 
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(noting that “[d]istrict judges are not mind readers”). Moreover, 
pro se parties are expected to comply with applicable procedural 
rules. See Chrisp v. Univ. of N.C.-Chapel Hill, 471 F. Supp. 3d 
713, 715–16 (M.D.N.C. 2020) (requiring pro se plaintiff to comply 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); M.D.N.C. L.R. 11.1(a) 
(requiring pro se litigants to comply with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the court's Local Rules, “and all other applicable 
law”). 
 The Bank argues that remand is necessary for several reasons. 
Principal among them is the contention that the complaint fails to 
raise a claim under federal law and there is no diversity between 
the parties. Mapp’s answer makes clear there is no diversity of 
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 7 at 2 (alleging that 
the Bank and Mapp are citizens of North Carolina “for diversity 
purposes”).) The question is whether federal question subject 
matter jurisdiction exists. 
 Removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which permits a 

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defendant to remove any action over which federal courts have 
original jurisdiction. Determination of the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction is made at the time of removal. Wis. Dep't of Corr. 
v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 390 (1998); McDonald v. AutoMoney, Inc., 
21CV114, 2021 WL 5599501, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 2021) (“The 
removability of a case depends upon the state of the pleadings and 
the record at the time of the application for removal.” (quoting 
Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 709 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2013))). 
Subject matter jurisdiction must appear on the face of the 
complaint, not by way of a defense raised or in a counterclaim. 
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 
826, 831-32 (2002). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction 
rests with the party seeking removal, and if it is at all doubtful, 
remand is necessary. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 
F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). A motion to remand the case based 
on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time. 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears 
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 
shall be remanded.”). 
 Mapp’s attempt to remove this action is patently frivolous. 
Mapp lacked any reasonable basis for seeking removal. The parties 
are not diverse, and there is no federal claim raised by the 
complaint. Plainly, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 
 Worse, Mapp has grossly misapplied federal law in his response 

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brief. As just one example, his citation to 28 U.S.C. § 1348 for 
the proposition that this court has jurisdiction over any action 
brought by or against a bank (Doc. 12 at 13) misrepresents the 
statute. Section 1348 by its express terms applies only to “any 
civil action commenced by the United States, or by direction of any 
officer thereof, against any national banking association, any 
civil action to wind up the affairs of any such association, and 
any action by a banking association established in the district for 
which the court is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the 
Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his 
direction, as provided by such chapter.” This case is none of 
those. 
 Another example is Mapp’s filing of a frivolous surreply with 
irrelevant attachments. “[A] surreply is not generally allowed 
under this district’s Local Rules.” Pathfinder Software, LLC v. 
Core Cashless, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d 531, 537 (M.D.N.C. 2015) 
(quoting Luna-Reyes v. RFI Constr., LLC, 57 F. Supp. 3d 495, 498 
(M.D.N.C 2014)). Mapp did not seek court approval to file his 
surreply. “Generally, courts allow a party to file a surreply 
only when fairness dictates based on new arguments raised in the 
previous reply.” Fulk v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 749, 
751 n.1 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (quoting DiPaulo v. Potter, 733 F. Supp. 
2d 666, 670 (M.D.N.C. 2010)). Absent a new argument, “a surreply 
is unnecessary.” Adefila v. Select Specialty Hosp., 28 F. Supp. 

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3d 517, 522 n.3 (M.D.N.C. 2014). Here, the Bank did not raise any 
new argument in its reply, so the surreply is totally unnecessary. 
Moreover, it and its attachments are filled with citations to 
irrelevant legal authority. 
 Mapp’s filings bear all the hallmarks of a product of 
Artificial Intelligence. Whether or not Mapp used Artificial 
Intelligence, he, like any other litigant, whether pro se or 
represented, is bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Johnson v. Town of Smithfield, No. 23-CV-349, 2024 WL 1336466, at 
*10 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2024) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 
U.S. 106, 113 (1993)). Rule 11(b)(2) provides that by signing a 
filing, an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that, to the 
best of his knowledge and after a reasonable inquiry, “the claims, 
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 
reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” The rule 
permits courts to sanction litigants for citations to non-existent 
case law, misrepresentations of case law, or frivolous legal 
arguments, regardless of the filer’s pro se status. See, e.g., 
Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 778 F. Supp. 3d 879, 882 (N.D. 
Miss. 2025) (ordering a pro se plaintiff to pay the defendant’s 
costs incurred in responding to fabricated citations). “Courts 
across the country have issued sanctions against attorneys and 
pro se parties for submitting fictitious case citations, 

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fictitious quotations, and related misrepresentations to the 
court.” United States v. Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1071 (E.D. 
Cal. 2025) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). 
This court has seen an increased use of Artificial 
Intelligence in briefs, especially by pro se filers. Any user of 
such tools, including a pro se filer, is still “obligated to read 
the legal authority he intends to rely upon, confirm its existence 
and validity, and confirm that it supports his legal contentions, 
before citing to that authority in any submission to this Court.” 
Allen v. W. Governors Univ., No. 25-cv-00325, 2026 WL 893368, at 
*1 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2026) (emphasis omitted). Obviously, Mapp 
did not do that. 
 Troublingly, Mapp has been warned in the past against pursuing 
frivolous claims: 
Mr. Mapp is warned that if he continues to file paper 
writings with no basis in fact or law, he is subject to 
sanctions. Lawsuits like this one waste the court's time 
and resources and are an abuse of the judicial process. 
If the plaintiff continues to make patently ludicrous 
assertions in court filings, the Court has inherent 
authority to impose sanctions. These may include a fine 
or a pre-filing injunction that restricts his access to 
the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Cromer v. 
Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817-18 (4th Cir. 
2004); Pippen v. Slaughter, No. 19- CV-891, 2020 WL 
2086136, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 30, 2020). 
 
Mapp v. Discover Bank, 25cv144, 2025 WL 1431144, at *2 (M.D.N.C. 
Apr. 29, 2025). 
 Though the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and will 

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remand the action, it does retain jurisdiction to consider the 
imposition of sanctions and/or reimbursement of actual expenses, 
including attorney fees, for Mapp’s wholly frivolous filings. 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“An order remanding the case may require payment 
of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, 
incurred as a result of the removal. ”); see Barlow v. Colgate 
Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d 1001, 1009 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(“[D]istrict courts have jurisdiction to decide Rule 11 sanctions 
motions on the merits, even when they are filed after the underlying 
action is remanded to state court.”). In light of the fact that 
over a year ago Mapp was warned not to make frivolous filings, 
the court will require Mapp to show cause why he has not violated 
Rule 11(b)(2) and why he should not be sanctioned. Further, if 
the Bank elects to file a motion and appropriate documentation 
for just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, 
incurred as a result of the removal, the court may require Mapp 
to pay the Bank’s such costs and expenses in lieu of any sanction 
that would be imposed pursuant to Rule 11. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, 
 IT IS ORDERED that the Bank’s motion to remand (Doc. 10) is 
GRANTED, and the action shall be REMANDED to the General Court of 
Justice, District Court Division, of Guilford County, North 
Carolina. 

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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mapp shall file a document within 
14 days, consistent with Rule 11, that shows cause why his patently 
frivolous removal of this action and his filing of briefing 
containing wholly inapplicable legal citations and propositions 
have not violated Rule 11(b)(2) and why he should not be sanctioned 
accordingly. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Bank shall have 14 days within 
which to file a motion for just costs and actual expenses, including 
attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal, with supporting 
documentation, if it desires to receive reimbursement of such costs 
and expenses from Mapp. If the Bank files such motion, Mapp shall 
have 14 days to file a response. 
 
 /s/ Thomas D. Schroeder 
 United States District Judge 
May 15, 2026 

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