govinfo:USCOURTS-ohnd-4_16-cr-00239-2

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
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JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER 
 v. 
 
 
 
PHILIP M. LEMON II, 
 
 Defendant-Petitioner. 
OPINION & ORDER 
 
On November 10, 2025, Defendant-Petitioner Phillip M. Lemon II (“Lemon”) filed a pro 
se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(c)(1)(A), also known as a motion 
for compassionate release, under the First Step Act. ECF 71. The Government filed a response in 
opposition on April 10, 2026. ECF 79. Lemon timely mailed his reply, which was received by the 
Court on May 11, 2026. ECF 80. For the reasons discussed herein, Lemon’s motion is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On July 27, 2016, Lemon was indicted on five counts: 
Count 1: Possession with Intent to Distribute Heroin in violation of 
21 U.S.C.§ 841(a), 21 U.S.C.§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 21 U.S.C.§ 851. 
Count 2: Possession with Intent to Distribute Fentanyl in violation 
of 21 U.S.C.§ 841(A)(1), 21 U.S.C.§ 841(b)(1)(C), and 21 U.S.C.§ 
2. 
Count 3: Maintain a Drug Involved Premises in violation of 21 
U.S.C.§§ 856(a)(1), 856(b) and 18 U.S.C.§ 2. 
Count 4: Felon in Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in 
violation of 18 U.S.C.§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). 
Count 5: Possession of Firearms During a Drug Trafficking Crime 
in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 
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ECF 1. On November 8, 2016, Lemon entered into a plea agreement where he pled guilty to Counts 
1, 2, and 5, and Count 3 and 4 were dismissed. ECF 32, 33. 
The Presentence Investigation Report ( “PSR”) calculated Lemon ’s base offense level as 
32. ECF 37, ¶ 22. This was calculated using the U.S. Sentencing C ommission’s 2016 Guidelines 
Manual. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11. A three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility yielded a total 
offense level of 29. ECF 37, ¶ ¶ 29-31. An evaluation of Lemon’s criminal history placed him in 
criminal history category VI. Id. , ¶ 48. Lemon’s total offense l evel of 29 and a cri minal history 
category VI resulted in an advisory guidelines imprisonment range of 151 months to 188 months 
for Counts 1 and 2. Id., ¶ 79. Count 5 carried a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five 
years, which must be imposed consecutively to any other counts. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 
The Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A) and (C) plea agreement recommended 
a sentence of 180 months for all three Counts, a significant downward departure from the advisory 
guidelines. ECF 33; ECF 37, ¶ 80. The Court adopted this request at a sentencing hearing on 
February 23, 2017, sentencing Lemon to 180 months imprisonment, along with a term of 8 years 
of supervised release, and a $300 total special assessment. ECF 40. Lemon is currently detained at 
Talladega FCI, with an expected release date of May 17, 2029.1 
Lemon previously filed a motion for compassionate release on November 18, 2020, 
arguing, inter alia, that his sentence should be reduced because his 9-year-old daughter’s mother 
recently died. ECF 42, at 8- 9. However, Lemon failed to provide “ any documentation of the 
incapacitation of his daughter’s grandparents ” and “the death of a minor child’s caregiver only 
amounts to an ‘ extraordinary and compelling reason ’ when the defendant has provided 
documentation that they are the only available caregiver for the child.” ECF 54, at 5 (citing United 
 
1 Find an Inmate, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited May 15, 2026). 
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States v. Collins, Case No. 15-10188, 2020 WL 136859, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 13, 2020) ). Further, 
even if Lemon had established an extraordinary and compelling reason, the C ourt found 
compassionate release was inapp ropriate because the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors 
continued to weigh against his release and denied the motion. Id., at 5-6. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A motion for sentence reduction filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) —a motion for 
compassionate release—is analyzed under a three- step inquiry. United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 
1048, 1054 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc ) (quotations omitted), cert. denied , 143 S. Ct. 2506, 
216 L. Ed. 2d 461 (2023) . First, when an imprisoned person files a motion for compassionate 
release, they must show exhaustion by either: (1) a warden denying their request; or (2) thirty days 
passing since their request was made without a response. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 
(6th Cir. 2020). 
Second, the Court must find that both “extraordinary and compelling” reasons justify a 
sentence reduction and that such a reduction would be consistent with policy statements issued by 
the Sentencing Commission. Jones, 980 F.3d at 1101. 
If an “extraordinary and compelling reason” is found, the final step of the inquiry requires 
re-weighing the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . McCall, 56 F.4th at 1054. When 
weighing these factors, a district court is permitted to consider a defendant’s “history and 
characteristics, including his propensity to be a danger to the community upon release, as well as 
the nature and circumstances of his offense.” United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 954 (6th 
Cir. 2021). 
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The defendant bears the burden of showing they are eligible for a sentence modification. 
United States v. McClain , 691 F.3d 774, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (the defendant bears the burden to 
show eligibility for reduction of sentence under Section 3582(c)(2)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. TIMELINESS 
Before Lemon can proceed with his motion for compassionate release, he must first 
demonstrate either that: (1) he has exhausted all administrative remedies; or (2) at least thirty days 
have passed since a Warden received his compassionate release request. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Here, Lemon states that he filed his request with the Warden on September 21, 
2025, and provides the Court with a copy of his request. ECF 71, at 4; ECF 71-2. The Government 
does not contest this. Since more than thirty days passed between Lemon filing his request with 
the Warden and his filing of the instant motion, he has satisfied the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies requirement. 
B. EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS 
1. First Step Act 
Lemon argues that after he had been sentenced in 201 7, the Sentencing Commission 
amended § 5H1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which addresses the relevance of age in 
sentencing. He argues that the Sentencing C ommission’s November 1, 2024, amendment 
(“Amendment 829”) 2 broadened the language for how a court may consider age, but particularly 
youthfulness, in deciding whether a downward departure in sentence is appropriate. ECF 71, at 8. 
Since Lemon’s prior convictions, which were taken into consideration during his sentencing, were 
 
2 https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/829. 
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committed when he was under the age of twenty -five, Lemon argues that the amendment could 
have resulted in a downward departure in sentencing. Id., at 9-10. 
However, the Sentencing Commission makes clear that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection 
(b)(6), a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been 
made retroactive) shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an extraordinary 
and compelling reason exists under this policy statement.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c). And Amendment 
829 is a non- retroactive change in sentencing law via an amendment to the Guidelines Manual . 
This means that Lemon would need to qualify under § 1B1.13(b)(6) in order for him to even 
potentially gain the benefit of Amendment 829. 
Unfortunately for Lemon, qualifying under § 1B1.13(b)(6) is no longer even an option, as 
the Sixth Circuit recently held the entirety of that subsection invalid. United States v. Bricker, 135 
F.4th 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed, Case No. 25-81 (U.S. July 18, 2025) (holding 
that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating § 1B1.13(b)(6) 
by “issu[ing] a policy statement that is plainly unreasonable under the statute and in conflict with 
the separation of powers ”). As this Court is bound by Bricker , any potential change in sentence , 
had Lemon been sentenced today, resulting from Amendment 829’s changes to § 5H1.1 cannot be 
relied upon as an extraordinary and compelling reason. 
2. Other Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons 
Lemon provides two other arguments to serve as the extraordinary and compelling reason 
for his compassionate release. First, he argues that his family circumstances qualify as an 
extraordinary and compelling reason because of the death of his minor child’s mother in 2020 and 
her grandparents, who have been caring for her in the interim, are now incapacitated and can no 
longer provide that care. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3) (A) states that a defendant’s family 
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circumstances may warrant a sentence reduction in the event of “the death or incapacitation of the 
caregiver of the defendant’s minor child.” However, the policy statement does not define what 
constitutes incapacitation or what the defendant is required to provide in order to succeed on this 
ground. 
Here, Lemon states that his daughter ’s mother passed away on July 5, 2020, and that his 
daughter has since been in the care of her grandparents. ECF 71, at 6-7. He argues that at this point, 
nearly six years later , “both grandparents are elderly and have had health issues to the point of 
being incapacitated and can no longer properly provide and/or care ” for his daughter. Id. , at 7 
(cleaned up). Lemon then states that he attached “diagnoses for both grandparents” to his motion; 
however, no such documentation was provided. Indeed, the Court observed this discrepancy and 
directed Lemon on February 10, 2026, “to submit any such documentation no later than March 3, 
2026, if he wishes for it to be considered by the Court.” Lemon later asked for an extension of that 
deadline, which the Court granted in part, giving Lemon until March 31, 2026, to place his 
supplemental documentation in the prison mail system. Approximately six weeks after the 
deadline, Lemon has not submitted an y documentation supporting his assertion that both 
grandparents are incapacitated. In his Reply, Lemon again states that he had “[a]attached diagnoses 
for both Elderly Parents of Monique,” but the Court notes that no such documentation was among 
the attachments to Lemon ’s filing. ECF 80, at 4. Without that information, it is impossible to 
determine whether or not this qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason. 
Lemon also argues that his rehabilitation in prison should counsel this Court to grant his 
motion for compassionate release. However, § 1B1.13(d) makes clear that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(t), rehabilitation “is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason.” See also United 
States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1004 (6th Cir. 2020) (observing the same). Rather, the Court may 
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consider any rehabilitation “in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and 
to what extent a red uction in the defendant ’s term of imprisonment is warranted.” U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.13( d). And since Lemon is unable to establish any other extraordinary and com pelling 
reason, his rehabilitation is not a reason to justify compassionate release. 
C. § 3553(A) SENTENCING FACTORS 
Even if Lemon were able to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason, the Court 
would still be required to weigh w hether a reduction in sentence is appropriate considering the 
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1); see also Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1001 (finding that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it “ denied relief to Ruffin not just because no 
extraordinary and compelling reasons existed, but also because the § 3553(a) factors weighed 
against his release”). 
Lemon argues that, even though he understands that his conduct was “extremely serious,” 
his term of Super vised Release for the next eight years (which would still take place, even if he 
were granted compassionate release) is sufficient to assuage any concerns the Court may have 
about his presence in the community. Additionally, the Court received several letters of support 
from Lemon’s family and friends . However, this is not sufficient to est ablish that he no longer 
poses a danger to the safety of any other person or the community. As the Court noted the last time 
it weighed these factors in Lemon ’s case, “Lemon was involved in significant drug trafficking 
activity involving multiple firearms. ” ECF 54, at 6. He also has a previous felony conviction, 
where he committed the offense while on Supervised Release for a prior conviction. When this 
Court granted Lemon the freedom to self-surrender for his sentence, Lemon abused that freedom 
and failed to self-report. Indeed, an investigation was necessary to locate Lemon and take him into 
custody a month later. 
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In sum, the Court finds that, even if Lemon had established an extraordinary and 
compelling reason, the § 3553(a) sentencing factors would still counsel against his early release. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that Lemon is ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). And even if he were eligible, the section 3553(a) factors weigh against his 
requested relief. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Lemon’s motion for sentence reduction. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 /s/Dan Aaron Polster 
Dan Aaron Polster 
Date: May 15, 2026 United States District Judge 
 
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