govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_24-cv-01640-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
 
SHANNON WICKER, 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
CAPTAIN PAPOOSHA, et al., 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 3:24-cv-01640 (VAB) 
 
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In this action, Shannon Wicker (“Plaintiff”) sued Daniel Papoosha, Craig Washington, 
and Lieutenant Dawson (collectively, “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Wicker alleges 
that these Defendants violated his procedural and substantive due process rights related to his 
Security Risk Group (“SRG”) designation. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Mot. for 
Summ. J.”) at 1, ECF No. 26-1. 
Defendants now move for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) Mr. Wicker failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies as to his asserted claims; (2) there is no genuine dispute of 
material facts and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) in any event, 
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. 
For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 
GRANTED. 
 
 

 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 
Mr. Wicker is currently a sentenced inmate in Department of Correction (“DOC”) 
custody at the Osborn Correctional Institution, having been sentenced on May 14, 2025. See 
DOC, Inmate Locator, available at 
https://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id_inmt_num=303518 (last accessed April 7, 
2026). But at the time of the allegations underlying this case, he had not been sentenced, and thus 
he was a pretrial detainee. Id. Mr. Wicker’s allegations relate to events that occurred while he 
was housed at the New Haven Correctional Center (“NHCC”). Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶¶ 1-2, 4, 
ECF No. 26-6. 
Mr. Wicker had previously been in DOC custody, and during that previous incarceration, 
Mr. Wicker was in the SRG program. Id. ¶¶ 15-16 (indicating Mr. Wicker had been designated 
as an SRG member on December 20, 2016), 54. On June 20, 2024, Mr. Wicker returned to DOC 
 
1 The factual background is drawn from Defendants’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement of Material Facts to the extent 
the facts set forth are supported by evidence in the record. See Local Rule 56(a)(1) (“Each material fact set forth in 
the Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement and supported by the evidence will be deemed admitted (solely for purposes of 
the motion) unless such fact is controverted by the Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement required to be filed and served by 
the opposing party.”). 
In response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Wicker submitted a filing entitled “Local 
Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of Facts in Opposition to Summary Judgment.” Opp’n at 32-39, ECF No. 29. 
Notwithstanding the title given to this submission, the filing does not comply with Local Rule 56(a)(2) because Mr. 
Wicker’s denials are not accompanied by specific citations to evidence in the record. See Local Rule 56(a)(3). 
In his sur-reply, Mr. Wicker recognizes this failure, and he asks the Court to forgive his mistake because of 
his pro se status. And in that filing, Mr. Wicker also attempts to file an “Updated Local Rule 56(a)(2) Additional 
Material Facts.” Sur-Reply at 8-9, ECF No. 32. Mr. Wicker’s updated statement, however, does not consistently cite 
to record evidence, either. Defendants object both to Mr. Wicker’s filing a sur-reply without leave of the Court, and 
his attempt to excuse his failure to adhere to the local rules. See Obj. to Sur-Reply, ECF No. 33. 
Based on Mr. Wicker’s failure to adhere to the Local Rules, the Court deems admitted Defendants’ 
Statement of Facts where those facts are supported by the record evidence. See Local Rule 56(a)(1). Mr. Wicker 
received notice of the filing requirements in the Defendants’ Notice to Self-Represented Litigant Concerning Motion 
for Summary Judgment as Required by Local Rule of Civ. Pro. 56(b). See Notice, ECF No. 26-7. 
That said, given Mr. Wicker’s status as a pro se litigant and his attempt to correct his mistake, in 
determining the existence of any genuine disputes of material fact, the Court has also considered, where appropriate, 
Mr. Wicker’s amended facts, his opposition, and the record evidence. 

 
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custody. Id. ¶ 4. When Mr. Wicker returned to DOC custody, Mr. Wicker had not yet completed 
his SRG program from his previous incarceration. Id. ¶ 56. The SRG program is a five-phase 
program, with Phase 1 being the most restrictive and Phase 5 being the least restrictive. Id. ¶¶ 
43-45. Thus, upon his readmission at NHCC, Mr. Wicker was placed in the Restrictive Housing 
Unit (“RHU”) pending an SRG designation hearing. Id. ¶¶ 5, 56. Daniel Papoosha is the DOC’s 
SRG coordinator. Id. ¶ 42. 
Once transferred to the RHU, Mr. Wicker learned he was under investigation for a 
pending SRG profile. Id. ¶ 6. On June 20, 2024, Mr. Wicker signed the notification of this 
investigation. Id. ¶ 7. 
A hearing on Mr. Wicker’s SRG designation was scheduled for June 27, 2024. Id. ¶ 10. 
On June 26, 2024—the day before his hearing—Mr. Wicker was interviewed. Id. ¶ 8. During that 
interview, Mr. Wicker learned the evidence that would be presented against him, and Mr. Wicker 
declined the opportunity to present witnesses or to receive the assistance of an advisor. Id. ¶¶ 8-
9. 
At Mr. Wicker’s June 27, 2024, designation hearing, Lieutenant Dawson served as the 
hearing officer. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B, at 8, ECF No. 26-3. He considered evidence including 
Mr. Wicker’s previous SRG affiliation and his social media posts while he was released. Defs.’ 
L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶¶ 10-12, 17. Mr. Wicker confirmed at this hearing that he did not request an 
advisor to assist him during the hearing and did not wish to present witnesses. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Mr. 
Wicker also indicated that the spelling of his name was different from how it appeared on the list 
at the hearing. Id. 
After the hearing, Lieutenant Dawson recommended that Mr. Wicker remain on SRG 
status. Id. ¶ 17. Mr. Wicker signed the SRG Membership Designation. Id. ¶ 18. On June 28, 

 
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2024, Mr. Wicker was transferred to the Corrigan Correctional Center. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, 
at 2, ECF No. 26-2. 
On July 9, 2024, Mr. Wicker appealed the SRG designation decision. Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)(1) 
¶ 33.2 The entirety of Mr. Wicker’s appeal reads: 
I was redesignated as a Blood and placed in SRG they have a paper 
with the name “Bishop” on it but my name is spelled “Bishup” two 
totally different spellings I disaffiliated myself year [sic] ago and I 
keep telling them that’s not me. From my understanding they got 
that paper well over 6 months ago and it was off somebody else 
phone that has nothing to do with me. I was told by a staff members 
[sic] that the evidence must be within 6 months and none of the 
evidence is I don’t understand how after 5 ½ years I’m still 
considered a threat to [the] population when my name [hasn’t] even 
been spoken through these jails there [are] no hits that I sent I 
haven’t been in a fight since December 2018 and before that I 
haven’t had a fight since entering SRG there is nothing showing that 
I’m a threat so can you please fix this and take me out the program 
I don’t even mind sitting on the blue card while you watch me 
 
Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C, at 23, ECF No. 26-4. District Administrator Washington is the Level 2 
administrative remedies coordinator. Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 31, ECF No. 26-6. Washington 
denied Mr. Wicker’s appeal on August 14, 2024. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C, at 23, ECF No. 26-4. 
In his denial, Washington wrote: 
An extensive review of your request for Security Risk Group 
Designation Appeal was completed. The Hearing Officer’s finding 
was reasonable based on information and evidence presented at a 
formal hearing on June 27, 2024. 
 
No due-process failure occurred in the disposition of your Security 
Risk Group Designation Hearing. There is no reason to modify the 
Hearing Officer’s decision. For these reasons, your appeal of 
Security Risk Group Member designation is denied. 
 
2 During the relevant time, Mr. Wicker filed three grievances/appeals. Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶¶ 33, 39, ECF No. 26-6. 
Two of those grievances are unrelated to this action. Id. ¶¶ 39-40 (describing the grievances as relating to cleaning 
supplies and an incident related to the shower). 

 
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Be advised that the decision of the District Administrator is not 
subject to further appeal. 
 
Id. at 22. 
After his designation, Mr. Wicker entered the SRG program at Phase 3. Defs.’ L.R. 
56(a)(1) ¶¶ 45, 57. 
On October 15, 2024, Mr. Wicker filed this lawsuit. Compl., ECF No. 1. 
On October 18, 2024, the Court granted Mr. Wicker’s motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis. Order, ECF No. 9. 
On March 7, 2025, the Court issued an Initial Review Order. Initial Review Order, ECF 
No. 14. In that order, the Court allowed Mr. Wicker to proceed on two claims: (1) a Fourteenth 
Amendment procedural due process claim against Dawson, Washington, and Papoosha; and (2) a 
substantive due process claim arising from the alleged punitive placement and conditions in the 
SRG Unit against Papoosha. Id. at 20. All other claims, including against other Defendants, were 
dismissed.3 Id. 
On April 17, 2025, counsel entered a notice of appearance for Defendants. Not. of 
Appearance, ECF No. 15. 
On May 27, 2025, Defendants answered Mr. Wicker’s complaint. Answer, ECF No. 17. 
On August 1, 2025, Mr. Wicker moved for a preliminary injunction. Mot. for Preliminary 
Injunction, ECF No. 20. 
 
3 To the extent Mr. Wicker argues in favor of his equal protection claim proceeding to trial, the Court dismissed that 
claim at the Initial Review Stage. Initial Review Order at 17-18 (dismissing “Mr. Wicker’s Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection claims . . . as implausible”). The Court, however, acknowledges that Mr. Wicker’s confusion may 
stem from a sentence later in the Court’s order, which referenced an equal protection claim proceeding. Id. at 20. 
Despite the inclusion of that sentence, however, the Court previously substantively analyzed and dismissed Mr. 
Wicker’s equal protection claim. 

 
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On August 11, 2025, Defendants opposed that motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 22. 
On August 21, 2025, Mr. Wicker filed a reply in support of his motion. Reply, ECF No. 
23. 
On September 2, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Wicker’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction because, among other reasons, Mr. Wicker failed to demonstrate the elements of 
irreparable harm or likelihood of success. Order, ECF No. 24. 
On December 5, 2025, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Mot. for Summ. J., ECF 
No. 26. 
On January 7, 2026, Mr. Wicker filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 
Opp’n, ECF No. 29; see also Order, ECF No. 28 (granting Mr. Wicker’s motion for extension of 
time to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment). 
On January 14, 2026, Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion for summary 
judgment. Reply, ECF No. 30. 
On February 10, 2026, Mr. Wicker filed a sur-reply. Sur-Reply, ECF No. 32. On February 
17, 2026, Defendants filed an objection to Mr. Wicker’s sur-reply. Obj., ECF No. 33. On March 
10, 2026, Mr. Wicker filed a response in support of his sur -reply. Resp., ECF No. 34. On March 
24, 2026, Defendants filed an objection to Mr. Wicker’s response. Obj., ECF No. 35. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A court will grant a motion for summary judgment if the record shows no genuine issue 
as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute 
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (“Of course, a party seeking 
summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the 

 
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basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”). The non-moving party may defeat 
the motion by producing sufficient evidence to establish that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “[T]he mere existence 
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of 
material fact.” Id. at 247-48. 
 “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. at 248. “Only disputes 
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 
preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id.; see Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 
1996) (“[M]ateriality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that can 
affect the outcome under the applicable substantive law.” (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248)). 
“The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need 
for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be 
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either 
party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. When a motion for summary judgment is supported by 
documentary evidence and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact,” the non-moving party must do more than vaguely assert the existence of some 
unspecified disputed material facts or “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated 
speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 

 
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The party opposing the motion for summary judgment “must come forward with specific 
evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, 
summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 
387 U.S. 82, 87 (1967) and First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 
(1968)). 
A court must view any inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the summary judgment motion. See Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338, 
343, 347 (2d Cir. 2017) (“On a motion for summary judgment, the court must ‘resolve all 
ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom 
summary judgment is sought.’”). A court will not draw an inference of a genuine dispute of 
material fact from conclusory allegations or denials, see Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 
358 (2d Cir. 2011), and will grant summary judgment only “if, under the governing law, there 
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 
III. DISCUSSION 
 Mr. Wicker claims the Defendants violated both his procedural due process and his 
substantive due process rights. As to the former, Mr. Wicker argues that his SRG designation 
hearing was procedurally flawed. And for the latter, he argues that his readmission to the SRG 
program when he returned to DOC custody and the conditions that he experienced while in the 
SRG program amounted to punitive conditions that violated his substantive due process rights. 
The Defendants argue that (1) Mr. Wicker failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; 
(2) Mr. Wicker’s claims fail on the merits; and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 
The Court will address each issue in turn. 

 
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A. The Procedural Due Process Claim 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects both a right to 
“substantive” due process and “procedural” due process. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998). A claim of violation of procedural due process must be analyzed by (1) 
asking whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, 
and (2) if so, whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient. 
Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam) (“As for the Due Process Clause, 
standard analysis under that provision proceeds in two steps: We first ask whether there exists a 
liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the 
procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient.”). In the prison context, which 
involves persons whose liberty interests are already severely restricted because of their 
confinement, a prisoner cannot show a cognizable deprivation of “liberty” unless he can show 
that he was subject to an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The liberty interest 
analysis under “Sandin does not apply to pretrial detainees.” Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 
188, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-70 (1974) and Hewitt v. 
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (qualified on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482-84)). 
Relevant here, the level of procedural protection required depends on the purpose of the 
hearing. Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he level of procedural 
protection differs according to the purpose of the confinement.”). For an administrative 
proceeding, the inmate is entitled only to “some notice of the charges against him and an 
opportunity to present his views [either orally or in writing] to the prison official charged with 
deciding” the matter. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476. The proceeding that decides whether an inmate 

 
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should be transferred to administrative segregation “must occur within a reasonable time 
following an inmate’s transfer.” Walker v. Quiros, 11-CV-00082 (MPS), 2014 WL 7404550, at 
*10 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2014) (citing Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476 n.8). 
For a disciplinary proceeding, an inmate is entitled to advance written notice of the 
charge, adequate time to prepare a defense, a written statement of the reasons for the disciplinary 
action taken, and a limited opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in his defense. Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-70 (1974). Both standards require “some evidence” to support the 
decisions to place an inmate in administrative or punitive segregation. See Elder v. McCarthy, 
967 F.3d 113, 129 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that a disciplinary determination must be supported 
by some reliable evidence of guilt). 
It is not settled which standard applies when analyzing a pretrial detainee’s hearing 
related to the SRG program. “Other courts ‘have considered that a pretrial detainee may have a 
liberty interest in being free from his restrictive conditions of the SRG Program according to the 
procedural protections set forth in Wolff.’” Saxon v. Connecticut, No. 3:24CV807 (AWT), 2026 
WL 381854, at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 27, 2026) (quoting Pena v. Czeremcha, No. 3:24-CV-938 
(SVN), 2024 WL 4388277, at *8 (D. Conn. Oct. 2, 2024)). Because the Court concludes that Mr. 
Wicker’s hearing satisfies the more stringent standard of Wolff, however, the Court need not 
determine which standard applies. See id. (holding that “[t]he court need not resolve the issue 
here because, even under the more demanding procedures of Wolff, . . . there is no genuine issue 
as to the fact that [the plaintiff] received the process due to him”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
First, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Mr. Wicker received advance 
written notice of the charge. The evidence shows that Mr. Wicker received notice of the charge 

 
11 
on June 20, 2024, when he was readmitted to custody. Pl. L.R. 56(a)(2) ¶¶ 6-8, ECF No. 29. Mr. 
Wicker disputes the veracity of this evidence because the notice contains a contradictory date—
at the top, the notice refers to June 21, 2024. Ex. B at 7; Reply at 9, ECF No. 30 (Defendants 
acknowledging this discrepancy and attributing it to a potential scrivener’s error). 
But that discrepancy is not consequential. The issue instead is the substantive sufficiency 
of the notice. “Even in cases involving administrative segregation based upon a prisoner’s 
membership in a gang, sufficient notice cannot simply recite vague or conclusory allegations of 
‘recent tension . . . involving gang activity.’ Rather, to be sufficient, notice must inform the 
defendant of more specific facts underlying the allegation that he is suspected of gang 
membership, for example, a report of contact with known gang members.” Taylor v. Rodriguez, 
238 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 2001). 
Here, Mr. Wicker’s notice read: “Inmate Wicker, Shannon . . . was designated as a 
member of the Bloods security risk group on 12/20/2016 and has yet to complete SRG member 
programming. As a result, an SRG readmission assessment hearing needs to be conducted to 
determine the status of inmate Wicker’s designation.” Ex. B at 7. Although referencing its 
purpose as a “readmission assessment,” this notice is deficient as “written notice of the charges . 
. . to inform [Mr. Wicker] of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a 
defense.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. 
But prison officials supplemented it in their June 26, 2024 interview with Mr. Wicker, 
memorialized in a section of the Security Risk Group Member Determination. Ex. B at 8. The 
unrebutted evidence here shows that prison officials interviewed Mr. Wicker the day before the 
hearing, during which Mr. Wicker learned of the evidence that would be used against him. Pl. 
L.R. 56(a)(2) ¶ 8 (Mr. Wicker admitting those facts). That evidence included previous affiliation, 

 
12 
public social media accounts, and confidential information. Thus, there is no genuine dispute of 
material fact that the notice was sufficient. 
Second, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Mr. Wicker had adequate time to 
prepare a defense. At the latest, Mr. Wicker’s notice was fully realized on June 26, 2024, and 
Mr. Wicker’s hearing occurred on June 27, 2024. Wolff itself confirms that twenty-four hours’ 
notice is sufficient to prepare for a hearing. Wolff 418 U.S. at 564 (“At least a brief period of 
time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the 
appearance before the Adjustment Committee.”). Mr. Wicker makes no persuasive argument that 
he did not have adequate time to prepare. Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that 
Mr. Wicker had adequate time to prepare a defense. 
 Third, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Mr. Wicker received a written 
statement of the reasons for the disciplinary action taken. Mr. Wicker admits he signed the SRG 
Membership Designation decision. Pl. L.R. 56(a)(2) ¶ 18. This decision provides the reasoning 
for the recommended designation. Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Mr. 
Wicker received a written statement of the reasons for the action taken. 
 Fourth, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Mr. Wicker had a limited 
opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in his defense. In his initial filing, Mr. Wicker 
denied that he declined the opportunity to present witnesses and to present his position. Pl. L.R. 
56(a)(2) ¶¶ 9, 14. But in his sur-reply Mr. Wicker clarifies that he “meant to admit that fact” 
because “he had just been admitted to [NHCC] so he had no witnesses to present.” Sur-Reply at 
2, ECF No. 32. This admission is aligned with the record evidence, which includes the Security 
Risk Group Member Determination report that indicates that Mr. Wicker declined to present 
witnesses. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B, at 8, ECF No. 26-3. Thus, there is no genuine dispute of 

 
13 
material fact that Mr. Wicker had a limited opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in his 
defense. 
Finally, on this record, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Mr. Wicker’s 
designation was supported by “some reliable evidence.” Fluker v. Kelly, No. 23-307, 2024 WL 
506578, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 2024) (summary order) (holding that inmate’s Facebook posts, “in 
the aggregate, satisfied the ‘some reliable evidence’ requirement” to designate inmate as an SRG 
member); see Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 
(1985) (stating that the due process “standard is met if ‘there was some evidence from which the 
conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced . . .’”); see also Elder, 967 F.3d at 
129 (“[W]e have required that such disciplinary determinations be supported by some ‘reliable 
evidence’ of guilt.”). 
The evidence included Mr. Wicker’s public social media posts and past SRG information. 
Pl. L.R. 56(a)(2) ¶ 12 (admitting in part and objecting in part that “the hearing officer was 
presented with information regarding the Plaintiff’s past SRG membership, social media post, 
and other information”). For example, the Security Risk Group Member Determination report 
shows that “[e]vidence gathered by the SRG Unit at Central Office confirms [Mr. Wicker’s] 
continued affiliation with the Bishop Bloods.” Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B, at 8, ECF No. 26-3. It 
continued, “[a] public social media account belonging to [Mr. Wicker] was discovered under the 
name ‘Pueblo Bishup,’ and other supporting evidence has been gathered [redacted] to confirm 
his continued affiliation.” Id. 
While Mr. Wicker argues that the decision to place him into the SRG program was 
predetermined, that the photographs identified are from eight months to five years before the 
hearing, and that the person identified in the social media posts was not him because Mr. Wicker 

 
14 
spells his name differently, Opp’n at 4-5, 21, those issues are not germane here. See Hill, 472 
U.S. at 454 (“Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the 
entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the 
evidence.”). 
Therefore, even “constru[ing] the facts in the light most favorable to” Mr. Wicker and 
“resolv[ing] all ambiguities and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences against” Defendants, 
Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 715 F.3d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted), there is no genuine dispute of material fact suggesting that the Defendants 
violated Mr. Wicker’s Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process in connection with 
his SRG designation hearing. 
Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment for Defendants on this claim. 
B. The Substantive Due Process Claim 
Administrative segregation measures do not “violate substantive due process where 
prison officials subject[] pretrial detainees to such measures in response to specific evidence that 
those detainees posed a risk to institutional security, and where the measures were not excessive 
in relation to that purpose.” Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 
2017). In Almighty Supreme Born Allah, the Second Circuit held that prison officials violated a 
pretrial detainee’s substantive due process when they placed him in administrative segregation 
“solely on the basis of his prior assignment to (and failure to complete) the Administrative 
Segregation program during a prior term of incarceration.” Id. at 57. Those officials, the Court 
held, “adhered reflexively to a practice that did not allow for individualized consideration of [the 
plaintiff’s] circumstances and that required him to be placed in Administrative Segregation 
regardless of his actual threat, if any, to institutional security.” Id. Even if a pretrial detainee has 

 
15 
been properly subject to administrative segregation, substantive due process applies to the 
conditions imposed on the detainee, which must be reasonably related to a legitimate government 
purpose. Id. at 55. 
Mr. Wicker separately claims that his time in SRG as a pretrial detainee violated his 
substantive due process rights. In this respect, Mr. Wicker challenges both his placement in SRG 
on his readmission to DOC custody and the conditions he experienced within the program. 
Examples of the conditions that he viewed as punitive include restricted phone calls, commissary 
use, programming, medical treatment, as well as discrimination. Opp’n at 4-5. Here, though, the 
Defendants make a compelling argument that Mr. Wicker failed to properly exhaust his 
substantive due process claim. 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a prisoner pursuing a federal 
lawsuit to exhaust available administrative remedies before a court may hear their case. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (providing in pertinent part that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to 
prison conditions under section 1983 . . . or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any 
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted”); see also Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 632-36 (2016) (applying the PLRA and noting 
that it “mandates that an inmate exhaust ‘such administrative remedies as are available’ before 
bringing suit to challenge prison conditions” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a))). “[T]he PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 
wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 
The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion,” meaning that an inmate must properly follow all 
steps required by the administrative review process applicable to the institution in which he is 

 
16 
confined. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“In Woodford, we held that to properly 
exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in 
accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ . . . rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but 
by the prison grievance process itself.” (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006))); see 
also Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2011) (exhaustion necessitates “using all steps 
that the [government] agency holds out and doing so properly” (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 
90)). “Exhaustion is mandatory—unexhausted claims may not be pursued in federal court.” 
Amador, 655 F.3d at 96; see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 211 (“There is no question that exhaustion is 
mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
An inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is only excusable if the remedies 
are, in fact, unavailable. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 642 (“Under § 1997e(a), the exhaustion 
requirement hinges on the availability of administrative remedies: An inmate, that is, must 
exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.” (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has determined that “availability” in this context 
means that “an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are 
capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained of.” Id. (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
The Supreme Court in Ross identified three circumstances in which a court may find that 
internal administrative remedies are not available to prisoners under the PLRA. Id. at 643-44. 
First, “an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or guidance 
materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently 
unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id. at 643. “Next, an administrative 

 
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remedy scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.” Id. 
Finally, an administrative remedy is not “available” when “prison administrators thwart inmates 
from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or 
intimidation.” Id. at 644. These circumstances are seemingly not exhaustive, see Williams v. 
Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016), but the Court is guided by these illustrations, see 
Mena v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-2430 (RJS), 2016 WL 3948100, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 
2016). 
 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. Thus, the Defendants 
carry the burden of proof. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216 (“We conclude that failure to exhaust is an 
affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or 
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”). When the defendants establish that administrative 
remedies were not exhausted before the inmate filed suit, the plaintiff must then show that the 
process was not available to him under Ross or present evidence that he did exhaust his 
administrative remedies. See Smith v. Kelly, 985 F. Supp. 2d 275, 284 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[O]nce 
a defendant has adduced reliable evidence that administrative remedies were available to the 
plaintiff and that the plaintiff nevertheless failed to exhaust those administrative remedies, the 
plaintiff must then ‘counter’ the defendant’s assertion by showing exhaustion, unavailability, 
estoppel, or special circumstances.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
As for how to properly exhaust, “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that 
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. For most claims, a plaintiff 
in DOC custody must exhaust remedies through the grievance procedures set forth in DOC 
Administrative Directive 9.6 (“A.D. 9.6”); see also Riles v. Buchanan, 656 F. App’x 577, 579 

 
18 
(2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (“The Connecticut Department of Correction (‘DOC’) requires 
inmates to submit grievances in accordance with Administrative Directive 9.6 (‘A.D. 9.6’)”). 
Before an inmate can file a grievance under A.D. 9.6, he must first seek “informal 
resolution.” Decl. of District Administrator Washington, Ex. A, Administrative Directive 9.6 § 
6.a.i, ECF No. 26-4. The inmate must attempt to “resolve the issue verbally” and, if this effort is 
unsuccessful, must “submit a written request via form CN 9601.” Id. If these informal resolution 
steps are unsuccessful, the inmate may file a Level 1 grievance using form CN 9602, which must 
be submitted within thirty calendar days after the occurrence or discovery of the cause of the 
grievance. A.D. 9.6 § 6.a.ii.4. The grievance must include documentation of the inmate’s written 
request to resolve the matter informally or an explanation of why such documentation is not 
attached. Id. at § 6.a.ii.2, 2(a). The Unit Administrator is required to respond in writing to a 
Level 1 grievance within thirty business days of receipt of the grievance. A.D. 9.6 § 6.b.i.3. An 
inmate may appeal to Level 2 if the Unit Administrator either denies a Level 1 grievance or fails 
to respond to the grievance in a timely manner. A.D. 9.6 § 6.b.ii. 
When the Unit Administrator denies a Level 1 grievance, the Level 2 appeal must be filed 
within five calendar days of the inmate’s receipt of the Unit Administrator’s decision. Id. at § 
6.b.ii.1. When the Unit Administrator fails to respond to a Level 1 grievance in a timely manner, 
the Level 2 appeal must be filed within sixty-five calendar days of the date the Level 1 grievance 
was filed. Id. at § 6.b.ii.2. Level 3 appeals are restricted to appeals of Level 2 decisions that 
challenge department policy or the integrity of the grievance procedure, or appeals to which 
there has been an untimely response by the District Administrator. Id. at § 6.b.iii.1. An inmate 
must file a Level 3 grievance using form CN 9605 within five calendar days of the Level 2 
denial, or, if the Level 3 form was submitted “as a result of an inmate not receiving a response to 

 
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a CN 9604, Inmate Grievance Appeal Form – Level 2 within 30 business days, [it] must be filed 
within 65 calendar days of filing the CN 9604, Inmate Grievance Appeal Form – Level 2.” Id. at 
§ 6.b.iii.2. 
Distinct from the general grievance process detailed above, appealing a Security Risk 
Group Member Designation requires following the process in Administrative Directive 9.6 § 7. 
An inmate may appeal an initial Security Risk Group member designation by completing form 
CN 9606 and depositing it in the Administrative Remedies box within fifteen calendar days of 
receipt of the decision. Id. at § 7.a.iii. The District Administrator will respond in writing within 
fifteen days of receipt of the appeal. Id. at § 7.a.iv.3.c. 
Here, Mr. Wicker filed his only relevant appeal on July 9, 2024, when he appealed the 
SRG designation decision. Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 33. As stated above, the entirety of Mr. 
Wicker’s appeal reads: 
I was redesignated as a Blood and placed in SRG they have a paper 
with the name “Bishop” on it but my name is spelled “Bishup” two 
totally different spellings I disaffiliated myself year [sic] ago and I 
keep telling them that’s not me. From my understandin g they got 
that paper well over 6 months ago and it was off somebody else 
phone that has nothing to do with me. I was told by a staff members 
[sic] that the evidence must be within 6 months and none of the 
evidence is I don’t understand how after 5 ½ years I’m still 
considered a threat to [the] population when my name [hasn’t] even 
been spoken through these jails there [are] no hits that I sent I 
haven’t been in a fight since December 2018 and before that I 
haven’t had a fight since entering SRG there is nothing showing that 
I’m a threat so can you please fix this and take me out the program 
I don’t even mind sitting on the blue card while you watch me 
 
Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C, at 23, ECF No. 26-4. Washington denied Mr. Wicker’s appeal on 
August 14, 2024. Id.; Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 31. In his denial, Washington wrote: 
An extensive review of your request for Security Risk Group 
Designation Appeal was completed. The Hearing Officer’s finding 

 
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was reasonable based on information and evidence presented at a 
formal hearing on June 27, 2024. 
 
No due-process failure occurred in the disposition of your Security 
Risk Group Designation Hearing. There is no reason to modify the 
Hearing Officer’s decision. For these reasons, your appeal of 
Security Risk Group Member designation is denied. 
 
Be advised that the decision of the District Administrator is not 
subject to further appeal. 
 
Id. at 22. 
 Because Mr. Wicker’s substantive due process claim relates to both his pre -hearing 
placement in RHU and his post -hearing conditions in the SRG program, to properly exhaust his 
administrative remedies Mr. Wicker was required to follow the procedure under Administrative 
Directive 9.6. Viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Wicker, Mr. Wicker did not do so. There 
is no record evidence that Mr. Wicker sought informal resolution or followed the leveled grievance 
system in Administrative Directive 9.6. 
 Moreover, Mr. Wicker ’s appeal is substantively a challenge to the result of his SRG 
designation hearing, and his appeal does not challenge either his initial placement in RHU or his 
conditions within the program. Rather, his appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence at his 
hearing and his subsequent placement in the SRG program. Mr. Wicker admits as much in his 
responses to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Opp’n at 7 (“The Plaintiff tried to 
utilize this office to challenge the decision made against him at his June 27, 2024 hearing on July 
9, 2024.”); see also Sur-Reply at 5 (“The Plaintiff’s only claim derives from the SRG Designation 
Hearing and nothing else[.]”). 
Having established that Mr. Wicker failed to properly exhaust his administrative 
remedies, Mr. Wicker must persuasively argue that the process was unavailable due to the 

 
21 
circumstances set forth in Ross. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 644 (finding that an administrative 
procedure is unavailable when: (1) “it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or 
consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) it is “so opaque that it 
becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use”; or (3) “prison administrators thwart inmates 
from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or 
intimidation.”). Mr. Wicker argues both that the process was functionally a “dead end” for him 
because of institutional corruption and also that he was deterred from exercising his right to that 
process because Washington denied his appeal of the SRG hearing decision. Opp’n at 3-4, 8, 23, 
25. Mr. Wicker claims that Washington’s conclusion that “no due-process failure occurred” 
thwarted his efforts from moving forward with exhaustion. Neither argument is persuasive. 
Mr. Wicker makes no compelling argument why the denial of his appeal of his SRG 
hearing decision would thwart his efforts to exhaust his separate claims, especially where Mr. 
Wicker makes clear that his appeal was limited to the SRG hearing decision. Moreover, Mr. 
Wicker provides no evidence of institutional corruption generally or in this instance specifically. 
Mr. Wicker’s assertions are conclusory and unsupported, which are insufficient to create a 
genuine issue of fact. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“[U]nsupported allegations do not create a material issue of fact.”). Thus, the Court determines 
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the grievance process was unavailable to Mr. 
Wicker. 
Therefore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Mr. Wicker failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process claim. 

 
22 
Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Mr. Wicker’s 
substantive due process claim will be granted.4 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained herein, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 
GRANTED. 
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants 
and to close this case. 
SO ORDERED at New Haven, Connecticut, this 15th day of May, 2026. 
/s/ Victor A. Bolden 
VICTOR A. BOLDEN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
4 Because Mr. Wicker’s claims will be dismissed, the Court need not address whether the Defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity. See Duamutef v. Hollins, 297 F.3d 108, 113 n.1 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[O]nce we decide that there is 
no constitutional violation, there typically is no need to address whether defendants are also protected by qualified 
immunity . . . .”); see also Feaster v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 37 F. App'x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Having affirmed 
the dismissal of Feaster's due process claim because of his failure to exhaust , and having vacated and remanded his 
retaliation and state law claims, this Court declines to reach the question of qualified immunity.”). 
 

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