govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_25-cv-02742-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

*
JOSEPH BARNES, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civ. No. 8:25- cv-2742-PX

SERGEANT TIMOTHY SNYDER et al., *

Defendants. *

***

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending is Defendants’ Sargeant Timothy Snyder, Deputy Thomas Snyder, and Deputy
Kortnie Marsch (collectively, “Defendant officers”)’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff Joseph Barnes
(“Barnes”)’ Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment to be granted in
their favor. ECF No. 18. The Court has reviewed the submissions and finds no need for a hearing.
D. Md. Loc. R. 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion, construed as one to dismiss , is
granted.
I. Background
On August 5, 2023, Ba rnes, his wife, and a friend were riding their motorcycles through
St. Mary’s County, Maryland, when Robert Allen Kinch (“Kinch”) ran a stop sign and struck
Barnes. ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 12–13. Thrown from his motorcycle, Barnes suffered extensive injuries.
Id. ¶ 37. Defendant officers responded to the emergency. Once on the scene, and despite Barnes’
obvious extensive injuries, the Defendant officers rifled through Barnes’ pockets and found in his
wallet a concealed-carry permit for a handgun. Id . ¶¶ 2 2–25. Defendant officers next asked
Barnes’ wife if he had a weapon. Id. ¶ 25. She said no but they frisked him anyway. Id. ¶ 29. No

officer asked the driver, Kinch, “a white American ,” the same questions; nor did they search
Kinch’s vehicle or look for alcohol or drugs, even though Barnes’ wife raised the possibility that
Kinch could have been driving under the influence . Id. ¶¶ 31–35. Kinch admitted fault for the
accident, and the officers issued him a traffic citation for failure to yield to the right of way of
another vehicle. Id. ¶ 42.
Barnes originally filed suit in St. Mary’s County Circuit Court against the St. Mary’s
County Office of the Sherif f. ECF No. 2. The County, on behalf of the Sheriff’s office, timely
removed the case and moved to dismiss the Complaint. ECF Nos. 1 & 6. In response, Barnes
amended the complaint, dropping the Sheriff’s office as a defendant and naming the Defendant
officers who had responded to the scene. ECF No. 11. The Amended Complaint accuses the
officers of negligence (Count I) , as well as violating Barnes’ rights under Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count II) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (Count III). Defendant officers move to dismiss all counts. ECF No. 18. The Court
considers each argument in turn.
II. Standard of Review
When a motion to dismiss is styled in the alternative as a motion for summary judgment,
the Court may exercise its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(d) to treat the
motion under either standard. See Bosiger v. U.S. Airways , 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007);
Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (D. Md.
2011), aff’d sub nom., 684 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2012). If the nonmovant opposes converting the
motion to one for summary judgment and formal discovery has not taken place, the nonmovant
must provide “by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, [he] cannot present facts
essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Where the nonmovant fails to file such

a declaration, he “cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery.”
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002); Nguyen v. CNA
Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he failure to file an affidavit under [Rule 56(d)] is
itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate.”)
(citation omitted).
Although Barnes asks the Court not to treat the motion as one for summary judgment, he
did not submit a Rule 56(d) declaration. However, because the claims so plainly fail as a matter
of law, and because no formal discovery ensued, the Court will construe the motion as one to
dismiss in an abundance of caution.
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule to Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “test s
the sufficiency of the complaint.” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc ., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007).
The Court “accept[s] the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Rockville Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville, 891 F.3d
141, 145 (4th Cir. 2018). However, the “Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint’s
conclusory statements without reference to its factual context.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
686 (2009). Nor can courts “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (“[T]he tenet that a court
must accept a complaint ’s allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of
action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.”). To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court must be able to deduce
“more than the mere possibility of misconduct” and the facts of the complaint, accepted as true,
must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 126 F.

Supp. 3d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679), aff’d as modified, 659 F. App’x
744 (4th Cir. 2016).
III. Analysis
A. State Claims (Counts I and II)
Defendants first argue that the common law and state constitutional claims (Counts I and
II) should be dismissed because Barnes did not satisfy the pre-filing requirements of the Maryland
Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), MD. CODE ANN., State Gov’t § 12-101 et seq. ECF No. 18-1 at 10–
11. See MD. CODE ANN., State Gov’t § 12-106(b)(1). The MTCA waives sovereign immunity for
state personnel who commit state constitutional and common law offenses sounding in tort .
Williams v. Morgan State Univ., 300 A.3d 54, 59 (Md. 2023). See also Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d
524, 536 (4th Cir. 2011) (analyzing Maryland Declaration of Rights Article 24 claim under the
MTCA). Pertinent here, deputy sheriffs such as Defendant officers are considered state
employees. See Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 321 F. Supp. 2d 642, 651 (D. Md. 2004) (citing Rucker v.
Harford Cnty., 558 A.2d 399 ( Md. 1989)). Thus, suits against them are subject to the MTCA’s
requirements.
Because the MTCA applies, Barnes was required to “submit[] a written claim to the [state]
Treasurer . . . within 1 year after” the incident forming the basis of the claims. MD. CODE ANN.,
State Gov’t § 12-106(b)(1). See also Brooks v. St. Charles Hotel Operating, LLC., No. CV DLB-
23-0208, 2023 WL 6244612, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2023) (“[T]he MTCA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity ‘is conditioned upon . . . the injured party filing notice of its tort claim with the State
Treasurer’s Office within one year after the injury.’”) (internal citation omitted). This requirement
remains a firm “condition precedent to the filing of a suit.” State v. Copes , 927 A.2d 426, 435
(Md. 2007).

Barnes concedes that he did not file a notice with the Treasurer. Instead, Barnes submitted
a notice to the St. Mary’s County Office of Law . ECF No. 20 at 3. He now asks the Court to
consider that filing as substantial compliance under the MTCA, relying on Faulk v. Ewing, 808
A.2d 1262 (Md. 2002). Id. Faulk, however, concerned the pre-suit requirements applicable to the
Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”), not the MTCA. Faulk, A.2d at 1265.
The LGTCA sets forth a separate statutory scheme whereby local governments provide limited
recovery for “those injured by local government officers and employees acting without malice and
in the scope of employme nt.” Moore v. Norouzi , 807 A.2d 632, 639 ( Md. 2002). But it is
undisputed that the “St. Mary’s County Sheriff and his Deputies are state officials when acting in
their law enforcement capacities.” Rossignol, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 651. Because of this , Barnes
was required to follow the MTCA’s pre-suit conditions, not the LGTCA. And the Court cannot
simply import the LGTCA requirements onto the MTCA . Accordingly, because Barnes failed
provide sufficient pre-suit notice to the state Treasurer as the MTCA requires , the Court must
dismiss Counts I and II. See Daulatzai v. Maryland, 606 F. Supp. 3d 252, 278 (D. Md. 2022),
aff’d, 97 F.4th 166 (4th Cir. 2024) (dismissing claims for failure to provide timely MTCA notice
to the state Treasurer); MedSense, LLC v. Univ. Sys. of Md., Civ. No. PWG-20-892, 2021 WL
3142004, at *9 (D. Md. July 26, 2021) (dismissing claims because the plaintiff “was required to
submit its written claim to the Maryland State Treasurer, or designee, within a year, but it did
not”).
Alternatively, even if Barnes had complied with the notice provisions, the claims
nonetheless fail for other reasons. As to the negligence claim, Defendant officers enjoy statutory
immunity under the MTCA if their acts were “committed within the scope of their duties [and]
when the violations are made without malice or gross negligence.” E.W. by & through T.W. v.

Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 187 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See
MD. CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b); M D. CODE ANN., State Gov’t § 12-105. Malice is
“characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing,
ill-will or fraud . . . . ” Lee v. Cline, 863 A.2d 297, 311 (Md. 2004) (quoting Shoemaker v. Smith,
725 A.2d 549, 559 (Md. 1999)). Gross negligence is defined as “an intentional failure to perform
a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another
. . . .” Barbre v. Pope, 935 A.2d 699, 717 (Md. 2007) (quoting Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co.,
495 A.2d 838, 846 (Md. 1985)).
When viewing the Amended Complaint facts most favorably to Barnes, nothing makes
plausible that Defendant officers acted with malice or gross negligence. As best the Court can
discern, Barnes’ negligence theory is that the Defendant officers searched his pockets and asked
about the presence of a weapon instead of tending to his injuries. ECF No. 11 ¶ 53. (“Defendants
breached their duty of care by touching Mr. Barnes person following his injury, with no regard to
his physical injuries and causing him unnecessary pain.”). But it is implausible that removing
Barnes’ wallet from his pocket alone would delay his care or inflict pain such that the officers can
be said to have acted with either an intent to injure (malice) or with reckless disregard for his life
or property (gross negligence). Simply put, no facts nudge the claim from possible to plausible.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Barbre, 935 A.2d at 714–15. See, e.g., Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d 121,
131–32 (Md. 1991) (holding conclusory allegations of gross negligence are not sufficient to bring
the claim outside of the immunity provisions of the MTCA); Graham v. Maryland, 738 F. Supp.
3d 644, 658 (D. Md. 2024) (holding a plaintiff cannot “simply includ[e] a claim for gross
negligence” to bring the claim outside the immunity provisions of the MTCA). Accordingly,
Defendants enjoy statutory immunity under the MTCA for the negligence claim . See Newell v.

Runnels, 967 A.2d 729, 766 n.28 (Md. 2009) (Maryland Supreme Court noting “the MTCA does
not distinguish between constitutional torts and common law torts”).
As for the Article 24 claim , Barnes appears to be averring the same equal protection
violation he pleads under the federal Constitution in Count III. See ECF No. 11 ¶ 66 (“Defendants
treated Mr. Barnes more adversely than Mr. Kinch on the basis of his race, although both were
involved in the collision, and Mr. Barnes suffered extensive and obvious physical injury.”) and id.
¶¶ 69 –76 (alleging race -based disparate treatment regarding the search of Barnes’ pocket and
questions about the presence of a firearm). See also Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447, 462 ( Md.
1995) (“While Article 24 contains no express equal protection clause, it nonetheless has been
construed to guarantee all persons the equal protection of the laws.”). But as discussed below, the
equal protection claim fails on the merits. See infra at 8–9. Thus, for the same reasons, so too
does the Article 24 claim. Counts II and III are dismissed.
B. Equal Protection Claim (Count III)
As for the equal protection claim, Defendant officers rightly point out that Barnes has sued
them exclusively in their official capacities. ECF No. 11 at 1. But plainly, the Defendant officers
enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity for such official capacity suits . See Pennhurst State Sch.
and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Indeed, claims against state employees acting
in their official capacities are subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity because a suit against the
state actor is tantamount to a suit against the state itself. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72
(1985); Bumgardner v. Taylor, Civ. No. RDB-18-1438, 2019 WL 1411059, at *6 (D. Md. Mar.
28, 2019) (“Maryland state law claims brought against Baltimore Police officers in their ‘official
capacity’ are also barred by sovereign immunity.”). Barnes does not respond to this well -placed
argument. The official capacity claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

To the extent Barnes intended to sue Defendant officers in their individual capacities, the
Amended Complaint does not make plausible an equal protection violation. The Equal Protection
Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Essentially, the Clause commands that “all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must
plead sufficient facts to demonstrate plausibly that he [or she] was treated differently from others
who were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminator y
animus.” Equity in Ath., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 108 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted);
see also Morrison v. Garraghty , 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To succeed on an equal
protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he [or she] has been treated differently from
others with whom he [or she] is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of
intentional or purposeful discrimination.”). If the plaintiff plausibly avers both prongs, the Court
next must “determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level
of scrutiny.” Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654 (citations omitted).
When viewing the Amended Complaint most favorably to Barnes, he has not made
plausible either prong of the claim . First, Barnes and his White counterpart, Kinch, were not
similarly situated. Barnes was grievously injured where Kinch was not. This matters when
considering that officers reasonably needed to identify the parties involved in a motor vehicle
accident. Because Kinch was not grievously injured, Defendant officers had no need to go into
his pockets to retrieve his identification . They could simply ask him . But Defendant officers
would need to retrieve Barnes’ identification if he were, as the Amended Complaint states, on the

ground, “bleeding” and “screaming in pain.” ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 22, 68, 93. Plainly, t he two men
were not “similarly situated” in the ways that mattered to the officers responding to an emergency.
Second, even if the two men were similarly situated, no complaint facts make plausible
that the officers treated them differently on account of discriminatory animus. Rather, Defendant
officers located a conceal ed carry gun permit in Barnes’ wallet. From this, the officers could
plausibly infer that a firearm may be nearby; after all, the purpose of the permit is to allow Barnes
to be armed in public. By extension, an officer would legitimately attempt to locate and make safe
a firearm safe once learning its possessor has been hurt . This gave the officers a plausible and
non-discriminatory reason for asking Barnes whether he had a firearm with him. B ut it would
make little sense to ask Kinch —who did not have such a permit —the same question. Simply
because one man is W hite and the other Black does not alone give rise to an inference of
discriminatory animus. See SAS Assocs. 1, LLC v. City Council for City of Chesapeake, Virginia,
91 F.4th 715, 720 (4th Cir. 2024) (“Discriminatory animus cannot be established simply by
showing ‘that a benefit was denied to one person while conferred on another.’”) (quoting Sylvia
Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995)). Thus, because the Amended
Complaint fails to state a plausible equal protection violation, Count III must be dismissed.
IV. Dismissal without or without prejudice
As for whether the claims should be dismissed with or without prejudice, the Court retains
wide discretion in this regard. See Weigel v. Maryland , 950 F. Supp. 2d 811, 825–26 (D. Md.
2013). D ismissal with prejudice is justified where, as here, Barnes was already alerted to the
pleading defects in a prior motion to dismiss, ECF No. 6, and nonetheless did not cure the defects
in the Amended Complaint , ECF No. 11. See Glover v. Loan Science, LLC , Civ. No. PWG-19-
01880, 2020 WL 3960623, at *3 (D. Md. July 13, 2020) (citing Adams v. Sw. Va. Reg’l Jail Auth.,
524 F. App’x 899, 900 (4th Cir. 2013)). Moreover, even if Barnes could somehow cure the MTCA

10
notice failure, the alleged facts in the Amended Complaint simply do not make plausible the
claims. Nor can the Court discern how Barnes could cure the factual shortcomings if allowed a
third bite at the apple. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2009), abrogated
on different grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020). Accordingly, the Court
dismisses the Amended Complaint with prejudice.
V. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. A separate Order follows.
_____________ ___________________________
Date
Paula Xinis
United States District Judge
5/13/2026 /s/

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